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THE MANAGERIAL EXCLUSION UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: ARE
WORKER PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS NEXT?
Bryan M. Churgin+
The National Labor Relations Act' ("the Act") guarantees workers
the right to form, join, and assist labor organizations of their own choos-
ing, free of employer interference. The Act sought to reduce industrial
unrest by establishing peaceful means of dispute resolution between em-
ployees and employers and lessen the inequality' of bargaining power be-
tween labor and management Initially, the Act statutorily defined cer-
+J.D. Candidate, May 1999, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994)). The NLRA or the Act, is the
1935 statute as amended at various later dates. See James J. Brudney, Reflections on
Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1563 n.1 (1996).
2. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). See generally 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
28 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992) (describing the "triad of rights-(1) the right to
organize, (2) the right to bargain collectively, and (3) the right to engage in strikes, pick-
eting, and other concerted activities"). Shortly after the passage of the NLRA, a steel
manufacturer challenged the constitutionality of Congress's authority to enact legislation
granting workers the right to self-organization and bargain collectively in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 25 (1937). In upholding the constitutionality of the
NLRA, the Court found that the NLRA "purports to reach only what may be deemed to
burden or obstruct [interstate or foreign commerce]" and, therefore, could be interpreted
to be within constitutional limits. Id. at 31.
3. See Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 281-83 (1978). See gener-
ally F. Ray Marshall, The Act's Impact On Employment, Society, and the National Econ-
omy, in AMERICAN LABOR POLICY: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT 16, 17 (Charles J. Morris ed., 1987) (hereinafter AMERICAN LABOR
POLICY) (commenting that the labor relations and economic policies of the 1930s, 1940s,
and 1950s promoted a growth in productivity, industrial output, and the income of work-
ers).
Congress specifically addressed the Act's goals in the preamble to the Act, where Con-
gress concluded that
The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal
by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and
other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary
effect of burdening or obstructing commerce ....
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to or-
ganize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recog-
nized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamen-
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tain individuals as "employees" (otherwise known as statutory employ-
ees) who were entitled to its protections.' Individuals employed as agri-
cultural laborers, domestic servants, or by their parent or spouse were
not statutory employees and were therefore excluded from the Act.5 The
current state of labor law, however, has narrowed the Act's coverage
even further.6 For example, in addition to an explicit exclusion of super-
tal to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to
wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargain-
ing power between employers and employees.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encour-
aging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designa-
tion of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. at 449-50 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994)).
Ultimately, these disputes between labor and management were to be brought before
"an independent agency with self-contained enforcement capacity and authority." Ken-
neth M. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the
Wagner Act, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 285, 292 (1987).
4. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. at 450 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994)). Prior to the 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments, the NLRA defined an employee to include
[A]ny employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular em-
ployer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current
labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained
any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include
any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of
any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or
spouse.
2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, 3271
(1985) [hereinafter 2 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 19351 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994)); see also infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text (discussing
statutory protection for individuals defined as employees).
5. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. at 450 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994)); see also David M. Rabban, Distin-
guishing Excluded Managers From Covered Professionals Under the NLRA, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1775, 1782 (1989) (commenting that the Wagner Act initially protected all individu-
als defined as statutory employees).
6. See Brudney, supra note 1, at 1578-80 (describing how over the years, individuals
possessing managerial or supervisory positions have been denied employee status and the
protections of the Act); see also Scott Kafker, Exploring Saturn: An Examination of the
Philosophy of "Total" Labor-Management Cooperation and the Limitations Presented by
the NLRA, 5 LAB. LAW. 703, 729-31 (1989) (explaining how employees fitting the defini-
tion of supervisor or manager are excluded from the NLRA and not entitled to protected
collective bargaining).
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visory employees,7 managerial employees have been implicitly excluded
from the Act's coverage.8 This managerial exclusion, compared to the
statutory supervisory exclusion, developed strictly as a result of the deci-
sions of both the Supreme Court and the National Labor Relations
Board ("the Board").9 As a consequence of this implied exclusion,
managerial employees are denied "the right to self-organization... [and]
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing."' °
In National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Aerospace Co.," the Su-
preme Court defined the test for managerial employees as "those [em-
ployees] who 'formulate and effectuate management policies by ex-
pressing and making operative the decisions of their employer.""' 2 This
7. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 2(3), Pub. L. No.
80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 137-38 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994)). The Act states
that "[t]he term 'employee' shall include any employee ... but shall not include ... any
individual employed as a supervisor." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).
8. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974); see also William P.
Murphy, Establishment and Disestablishment of Union Representation, in AMERICAN
LABOR POLICY, supra note 3, at 61-62 (commenting that after the Board had been unclear
in its treatment of managerial employees, the Supreme Court "gratuitously excluded"
managerial employees from the Act's protections). For a general overview of the collec-
tive bargaining rights of managerial employees after the Wagner Act, see E. V. Wahn,
Collective Bargaining Rights of Managerial Employees in the United States and Canada, 27
LAB. L.J. 343, 345-46 (1976).
9. See, e.g., Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 289 (concluding that "the Board's early deci-
sions, the purpose and legislative history of the [Act], the Board's subsequent and consis-
tent construction of the Act for more than two decades, and the decisions of the courts of
appeals all point unmistakably to the conclusion that 'managerial employees' are not cov-
ered by the Act") (footnote omitted); Barbara A. Lee, Collective Bargaining and Em-
ployee Participation: An Anomalous Interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act, 38
LAB. L.J. 274, 275-76 (1987) [hereinafter Lee, Collective Bargaining Part II] (noting that
although the Act does not protect either supervisory or managerial employees, the statute
excludes supervisors, the Board read in a managerial exclusion); Rabban, supra note 5, at
1787-88 (noting that based on Board opinions, managers would not be protected under the
Act).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994) (noting some of the rights of employees who are covered
by the NLRA); see also Ben M. Germana, Protecting Managerial Employees Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 405,405 (1991) (noting that managerial
employees are excluded from the right to organize under the Act).
11. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
12. Id. at 288 (quoting Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4
(1947)); see also NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 682-83 (1980) (holding that the
managerial employees also must exercise independent discretion when effectuating man-
agement's policies). Both the Board and the courts have approved of two related tests for
managerial status. See Matthew W. Finkin, The NLRB in Higher Education, 5 U. TOL. L.
REV. 608, 614-15 (1974). These tests accord managerial status to individuals "closely
aligned with management whose inclusion in a bargaining unit would create a conflict of
interest with rank-and-file workers; and those who formulate, determine, and effectuate
the employer's policies." Id.
1999]
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determination, however, has not resulted in a clear distinction between
managerial employees and rank-and-file workers.13 The Court's decision
endorsed the Board's definition of managerial employee and its test for
managerial authority.14 This holding did not ensure, however, that the
strict dichotomy between employees, who are protected by the Act, and
managers, who are not protected by the Act, would be maintained."
The drafters of the Act could not have contemplated the composition
of the nation's current labor force. 16 The percentage of workers who
13. See Donna Sockell, The Future of Labor Law: A Mismatch Between Statutory In-
terpretation and Industrial Reality?, 30 B.C. L. REV. 987, 988-89 (1989) (noting that socie-
tal forces have blurred the dissimilarities between supervisors/managers and nonman-
agerial employees); see also Stephen I. Schlossberg & Steven M. Fetter, U.S. Labor Law
and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation, 3 LAB. LAW. 11, 21 (1987) (noting that
an attempt to distinguish between those who do work for an organization and those who
decide how to run the organization would lead to suspect results because many labor-
manageme'nt cooperation programs deliberately blur the line between manager and
worker); Carol A. Glick, Note, Labor-Management Cooperative Programs: Do They Fos-
ter or Frustrate National Labor Policy?, 7 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 219, 220 (1989) (noting how
the use of labor-management cooperative programs have blurred the line between em-
ployees and management).
14. Compare supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting Court's definition of
managerial employee in Bell Aerospace as "those [employees] who 'formulate and effec-
tuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their em-
ployer"'), with Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946) (stating that managerial
employees are those individuals "who are in a position to formulate, determine, and effec-
tuate management policies") (footnote omitted); see also Shaun G. Clarke, Note, Re-
thinking the Adversarial Model in Labor Relations: An Argument for Repeal of Section
8(a)(2), 96 YALE L.J. 2021, 2042 (1987) (commenting that management's role, as a result
of the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Aerospace, is to make discretionary decisions that
effectuate management policy).
15. See Sockell, supra note 13, at 994-95 (noting that the task of distinguishing be-
tween workers is more difficult currently than in the past); see also Note, Collective Bar-
gaining as an Industrial System: An Argument Against Judicial Revision of Section 8(a)(2)
of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1677 (1983) (declaring that
the industrial system implicit in the Act depends on the existence of a clear division be-
tween labor and management for collective bargaining purposes).
16. See Marina Angel, Professionals And Unionization, 66 MINN. L. REV. 383, 416
(1982) ("Congress drafted the NLRA to ameliorate the problems of rank and file workers
employed by hierarchical, bureaucratic organizations. The composition of the work force,
however, has changed significantly in recent years.") (footnote omitted). The Act devel-
oped in the context of the industrial model, characterized by an adversarial system, where
management's interests were inherently at odds with those of labor. See id at 387, 389.
The industrial model of labor relations is a situation in which employees "explicitly un-
derst[and] that the firm will adjust the size of the labor force in response to product condi-
tions or technological change." Mark Berger, Unjust Dismissal and the Contingent
Worker: Restructuring Doctrine for the Restructured Employee, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
1, 12 n.52 (1997); see also John Hoerr, America's Labor Laws Weren't Written for a Global
Economy, BUS. WK., Jan. 13, 1986, at 38 (noting how at the time of its passage, the Act
was intended to deal only with the "all-out warfare" between labor and management).
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could be deemed managerial has grown significantly over the last ten
years," since there has been a move away from traditional blue-collar
jobs" towards those positions that require managerial skills.' 9 Between
1970 and 1985, there was a seventy percent growth in the managerial and
professional workforce; as a result, by 1985, managerial and professional
workers comprised fifty-five percent of the total workforce. ° The con-
tinuance of this trend may lead to further difficulties for the Board and
courts in distinguishing among workers who will be afforded the Act's
21protections.
The increasing use of worker participation programs22 in recent years,
which could blur the distinction between labor and management, 23 illus-
trates the problem with the implied managerial exclusion. Worker par
17. George T. Silvestri, Occupational Employment to 2005, reprinted in 240 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-3, E-4 (Dec. 14, 1995) (noting that workers in managerial, executive,
and administrative positions are expected to grow by 17%, or 2.2 million workers, between
1994 and 2005).
18. See Peter D. DeChiara, Rethinking the Managerial-Professional Exemption of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 139, 151 (1993) (stating that, by 1989, mana-
gerial employees outnumbered blue-collar workers in the U.S.).
19. See Sockell, supra note 13, at 995-96. Statistics show that, "between 1970 and
1985, the managerial and professional workforce has grown ... from 48 to 55 % of the
employed labor force." See id. at 995.
20. See id. at 995.
21. See id. In 1985, for example, 55% of those employed in the workforce held jobs
requiring the use of managerial, professional, or technical skills. See id. This is compared
to 33% of workers holding similar jobs in 1940. See id.
22. See generally Note, Participatory Management Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of
the National Labor Relations Act, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1736, 1738-40 (1985) [hereinafter
Participatory Management] (noting how these various programs generally emphasize "in-
creased employee involvement" in the organizational decision-making process). These
programs have been "classified in general terms into several categories." H.R. REP. No.
104-248, at 6 (1995). Some of the more common forms of these employee involvement
programs are quality circles, quality of work-life programs, productivity gainsharing, and
self-directed work teams. See id. at 6-7; see also Robert B. Moberly, New Directions in
Worker Participation and Collective Bargaining, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 765, 775-80 (1985)
(discussing characteristics of quality of work-life programs, quality circles, and productiv-
ity gainsharing plans). The desired result of these programs is to increase employee job
satisfaction and organizational performance. See id.
23. See Germana, supra note 10, at 421-22 (noting that proponents of the managerial
exclusion, express concern that "elimination of the ... exclusion would blur the line be-
tween management and labor").
24. See Charles B. Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the
Twenty-First Century, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 633, 673 (noting that traditionally, employees
have only had indirect involvement in American industry via the collective bargaining
process). Initially management was suspicious that as these worker participation programs
expanded, workers would use them to take over traditional management functions and
prerogatives. See id. at 675. These fears turned out to be unfounded, as cooperative pro-
grams have led to new methods of problem solving and resulting increases in efficiency
1999]
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ticipation programs, strongly favored by both labor and management,2
are designed to provide workers with more authority, flexibility, and sat-
isfaction in the performance of their jobs.26 The actual level of authority
and power afforded employees in these groups, though, differs from pro-
gram to program.27 As worker participation programs move away from
merely furnishing information to management, and towards allowing
workers to make decisions traditionally managerial in nature,28 however,
"employees" with increased participation in the management
decision-making process may not be considered statutory employees un-
der the Act.29 As a result, these individuals would no longer be protected
and harmony in the workplace. See id. For an overview of the current state of labor law,
see Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future Of Labor Law Reform, 12 LAB.
LAW. 117 (1996). The Dunlop Commission, instituted in March 1993 by Secretary of La-
bor Robert B. Reich, set out to reexamine American labor law and evaluate changes to
help enhance productivity and labor-management cooperation. See id. at 120. The com-
mission recommended that individuals who participate in work teams should not be
deemed managers or supervisors and be denied the Act's statutory protections. See id. at
123-24; see also Lee, Collective Bargaining Part II, supra note 9, at 275 (commenting on
the inconsistent development of the managerial exclusion).
25. See Craver, supra note 24, at 675. One poll indicated that 70% of union and busi-
ness officials strongly favored the increased use of labor-management cooperative pro-
grams, while 50% reported "significant movement" towards the use of such programs in
the near future. See id.; see also Shannon Browne, Note, Labor-Management Teams: A
Panacea for American Businesses or the Rebirth of a Laborer's Nightmare?, 58 OHIO ST.
L.J. 241, 243 (1997) (stating how the underlying consideration of worker participation pro-
grams is the benefit of mutual respect and cooperation over the traditional confrontation
between management and labor).
26. See Joseph B. Ryan, Comment, The Encouragement of Labor-Management Co-
operation: Improving American Productivity Through Revision of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, 40 UCLA L. REV. 571, 587 (1992); see also Craver, supra note 24, at 676-77
(describing the widespread use of labor-management cooperation in many Japanese com-
panies and the resulting success of the programs); Chris Doucouliagos, Worker Participa-
tion and Productivity in Labor-Managed and Participatory Capitalist Firms: A Meta-
Analysis, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 58, 58-59 (1995) (stating how supporters of worker
participation schemes also believe that these programs strengthen workers' commitment
to the organization, reduce the need for monitoring worker performance, and increase
overall efficiency and productivity of the organization).
27. See Moberly, supra note 22, at 778 (noting that the success of these programs,
where there is a divergence of worker authority, depends upon the extent to which man-
agement assigns authority to those who have the greatest role in the job).
28. See RICHARD N. BLOCK ET AL., LABOR LAW, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND
EMPLOYEE CHOICE 29-31 (1996) (noting that during the 1980s, labor-management coop-
eration gave workers the opportunity to become involved "in product design, marketing,
and other management prerogatives, often making changes in the production process" and
that production decisions were made by operating teams of workers, reducing supervisory
personnel requirements).
29. See Browne, supra note 25, at 266-67 (commenting that one pitfall of cooperative
programs is that workers exercising managerial power may loose the Act's protections); cf
Marley S. Weiss, Innovations In Collective Bargaining: NUMMI-Driven to Excellence, 13
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by the Act.3"
This Comment first examines the various types of worker participation
plans currently being used by corporations in the United States. In Part
II, this Comment traces the history of the National Labor Relations Act,
specifically focusing on the evolution of the implied managerial exclusion
and the express supervisory exclusion. In Part III, this Comment ana-
lyzes the Bell Aerospace decision and its extension of the implied mana-
gerial exclusion. Finally, this Comment addresses the implications of the
Bell Aerospace decision, namely in the context of extending the manage-
rial exclusion to employees involved in worker participation schemes.
Specifically, this Comment discusses the potential problem with the
managerial exclusion by examining the use of a worker participation
program at the Saturn division of the General Motors automobile com-
pany. This Comment concludes that the vague language adopted by the
Supreme Court in Bell Aerospace could likely have unintended far-
reaching effects, namely, that the implied managerial exclusion could
cause rank-and-file workers to be treated as managerial employees ineli-
gible for the protections of the Act. To correct these shortcomings, this
Comment suggests that the Board engage in rule making to explicitly
protect employees participating in worker participation programs as well
as create an express definition of managerial employees and how they
should be treated under the Act.
I. WORKER PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS-AN OVERVIEW
Worker participation schemes, which have been in existence since
1871, have had an enduring legacy.3 Participatory programs generally
represent an effort by management32 to enhance an employee's involve-
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 433, 484-85 (1996) (commenting that as a result of the broad defini-
tion of managerial employees, those individuals who assume more authority within the
decisionmaking hierarchy risk being transformed into managers or supervisors under the
Act). These plans, which are a type of worker participation scheme, could transform un-
ionized employees into managers or supervisors, not protected by the Act. See id. The
guiding philosophy behind NUMMI type programs contains the element "every employee
as a manager." Id. at 484.
30. See infra notes 297-302 and accompanying text (discussing how the managerial
exclusion could exclude individuals in worker participation programs from the Act's pro-
tections).
31. See Raymond L. Hogler, Worker Participation and Representation in the United
States and the European Union: A Comparative Legal Analysis, 47 LAB. L.J. 586, 589
(1996).
32. See Participatory Management, supra note 22, at 1737 n.11 (noting that manage-
ment is more likely than employees to suggest changes in workplace organization in non-
unionized settings); cf. Lori M. Beranek, Comment, The Saturnization of American Plants:
Infringement or Expansion of Workers' Rights?, 72 MINN. L. REv. 173, 192 (1987) (noting
1999]
Catholic University Law Review
ment in the organizational decision-making process.33 Management, in
addition to using internal and external consultants, often relies on the or-
ganization's formal corporate policy or philosophy statements in imple-
34menting a worker participation scheme. These cooperative programs
comprise a broad range of methods in which employers and employees
work together to improve an organization's overall performance. 5
Workplace participatory schemes have the potential to "increase produc-
tivity, quality, and employee commitment and allow American busi-
ness[es] to regain a competitive position in the global marketplace."36
The structure of a corporation's participatory scheme is based on the
firm's style or theory of management37 in conjunction with the method in
which workers commonly communicate ideas and concerns with man-
agement.8 Employee participation plans "attempt[] to provide a channel
that labor unions have traditionally opposed these various worker participatory pro-
grams).
33. See Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Signifi-
cance of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REV. 499, 504 (1986) (noting that the use of worker
participation programs may increase worker morale and job satisfaction); see also Glick,
supra note 13, at 233-34 (noting how worker participation programs initially developed as
an effort to enlist employee suggestions regarding efficiency and quality control within the
workplace). By 1997, an estimated 30,000 workplaces, comprising 80% of the United
States largest employers, utilized employee involvement programs. S. 295, 105th Cong. §
2(a)(3) (1997); H.R. 634,105th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (1997).
34. See Sandra L. Nunn, Comment, Are American Businesses Operating Within the
Law? The Legality of Employee Action Committees and Other Worker Participation
Plans, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1379, 1393 (1995).
35. See Wilson McLeod, Labor-Management Cooperation. Competing Visions and
Labor's Challenge, 12 INDUS. REL. L.J. 233, 241 (1990). The methods of cooperation may
include
participation at the strategic level, including decisions about marketing, research
and development, and long-term investment; at the collective bargaining level,
including the negotiation of basic agreements that fix the terms and conditions of
employment; and most commonly, the workplace level, which involves the day-
to-day work lives of employees and their relationships with management.
Id.
36. Devki K. Virk, Note, Participation with Representation: Ensuring Workers' Rights
in Cooperative Management, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 729, 730; see also David W. Orlandini,
Comment, Employee Participation Programs: How to Make Them Work Today and in the
Twenty-First Century, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 597, 597 (1995) (noting how American business,
since the late 1970s, has gradually implemented employee participation programs to en-
hance both productivity and communication with management).
37. See Kohler, supra note 33, at 501. These schemes usually involve joint consulta-
tion between management and workers, where management ultimately makes the final
decision or delegates greater responsibility to the workers. See id. at 503.
38. See id. For example, advocates of a socialist ideology structure communication in
a formal manner. See id. at 501 n.5. The use of representatives to deal with worker con-
cerns is characteristic of this model. See id. The human relations tradition, on the other
hand, focuses on cooperation and partnership between management and labor. See id.
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of employee influence outside the collective bargaining arena."39 Work-
ers utilize these newly formed channels of communication "to advise
management on those decisions [directly] affecting their work environ-
ment. 40 The use of these participatory programs can be found in nu-
merous sectors of the economy, including the automobile, airline, and
41paper industries.
The types of participatory programs are diverse and involve a wide
range of employee involvement in the decision-making process.42  The
least participative programs consist of employee surveys and question-
naires, while programs at the other end of the spectrum involve profit
sharing and employee ownership. 43 The three most commonly used
plans, and the most troublesome to define,44 are quality circles (QCs),
semi-autonomous work groups, and labor-management committees.
45
39. Andrew A. Lipsky, Comment, Participatory Management Schemes, the Law, and
Workers' Rights: A Proposed Framework of Analysis, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 667, 673 n.27
(1990).
40. Susan Gardner, The National Labor Relations Act and Worker Participation
Plans: Allies or Adversaries?, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 5 (1988) (footnote omitted).
41. See John Calhoun Wells, Conflictive Partnership: A Strategy for Real World La-
bor-Management Cooperation, 47 LAB. L.J. 484, 485-86 (1996); see also Barbara A. Lee,
Collective Bargaining and Employee Participation: An Anomalous Interpretation of the
National Labor Relations Act, 38 LAB. L.J. 206, 206 (1987) [hereinafter Lee, Collective
Bargaining Part I] (noting that even though most formal worker participation programs
are found in the manufacturing sector, use of these programs have expanded to other sec-
tors such as health care, servide, and technical). But cf. Nunn, supra note 34, at 1397
(noting that participation programs are rarely found in segments of the service sector
other than the telecommunications and insurance fields).
42. Cf. Martin T. Moe, Participatory Workplace Decisionmaking and the NLRA: Sec-
tion 8(a)(2), Electromation, and the Specter of the Company Union, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1127, 1156-57 (1993). In addition to the utilization of diverse types of programs, there are
various definitions regarding what is an employee involvement program. See David
Lewin, The Future of Employee Involvement/Participation in the United States, 40 LAB.
L.J. 470, 470 & n.1 (1989).
43. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 579 (noting that employee ownership and profit
sharing allow employees more input in operating the business); see also LLOYD L. BYARS
& LESLIE W. RUE, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 366, 376-79 (4th ed. 1994) (de-
scribing various types of incentive pay systems, such as Scanlon-type plans, productivity-
based profit-sharing plans, and employee stock ownership plans, all of which "attempt to
relate pay to performance in an endeavor to reward above-average performance"); Ed-
ward M. Dicato, Employee Involvement Teams Under the National Labor Relations Act:
Do They Inherently Conflict?, 1990 DET. C.L. REV. 691, 697 (commenting that employee
surveys allow for a limited form of employee involvement); Kohler, supra note 33, at 508
(describing the use of opinion surveys).
44. See Lipsky, supra note 39, at 675 (noting the difficulty in categorizing these
worker participation programs because of theirhybrid nature). These programs, however
successful they may be, have received mixed reactions from labor groups, management,
the National Labor Relations Board, and the courts. See id.
45. See Kohler, supra note 33, at 509; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory
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However, worker participatory schemes all "represent efforts to in-
volve workers in the overall operation of an enterprise for the simulta-
neous purposes of improving productivity, competitiveness, and job satis-
faction., 46  As a result, "[t]here is no single dominant arrangement of
participatory and cooperative schemes.4 7 This fact makes defining these
various programs troublesome.4 8  For .purposes of this Comment, the
terms "worker participation scheme" and "participatory scheme" refer
generally to all of these various committees that exist within the work-
place. 9
A. Quality Circles
Generally, a quality circle [QC] consists of a small group of workers
meeting regularly, on a voluntary basis, to analyze shop floor concerns
and recommend solutions to management.' This small group may in-
clude workers, supervisors, and managers, which may help overcome
Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 685 (1996) (noting that
quality circles are the most discussed form of worker participation schemes). Quality cir-
cles operate through a small group of employees (from five to fifteen) meeting regularly
during work time to discuss issues of workplace performance. See id. The main focus of
the quality circle is to reduce the "us versus them mentality," using group effort and feed-
back from management regarding the workers' efforts. See id. Quality circles are unique
in that members often come from one department within the organization. See id. Semi-
autonomous workgroup programs are comprised of teams that are responsible for a spe-
cific aspect of the production process. See Kohler, supra note 33, at 507-08; see also
Clarke, supra note 14, at 2025 (describing general characteristics of semi-autonomous
work teams).
46. Jonathan B. Goldin, Comment, Labor-Management Cooperation: Bath Iron
Works's Bold New Approach, 47 ME. L. REV. 415, 434 (1995); see also Electromation, Inc.
v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1156 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that "many United States companies
have developed employee involvement structures which encourage employee participation
in the design of workplace policies and procedures to improve the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of the corporate organization and to create a workplace environment which is
satisfactory to employees").
47. Goldin, supra note 46, at 433.
48. See McLeod, supra note 35, at 234 (noting that the difficulty in defining these
programs is based on the fact that various types of programs often are described as quality
of worklife initiatives or quality circles); see also BLOCK, supra note 28, at 35 (noting that
"[a]lthough there is no legally accepted definition of an [employee participation plan], it
may be defined as a structure or program under which firms solicit suggestions or input
from employees on workplace issues").
49. See Kristine Price, Comment, Tearing Down the Wall: The Need for Revision of
NLRA § 8(a)(2) to Permit Management-Labor Participation Committees to Function in the
Workplace, 26 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1393, 1393-94 (1995).
50. See Kohler, supra note 33, at 506. These programs are patterned on Japanese
schemes and "turn[] over to workers the responsibility to identify and solve product qual-
ity and production problems." Id.; see also Bainbridge, supra note 45, at 686 (describing
how elements of QCs point to their "information gathering function").
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"traditional status distinctions and job definitions."'" Participatory
schemes, such as QCs, have evolved as employers responded to decreas-
ing productivity and foreign competition." Some programs have evolved
based on unilateral actions of management, while others are established
through a collective bargaining agreement. 3 QCs typically have a dual
purpose. 4 First, QCs aim to improve productivity by increasing workers'
attention to the quality of the product.5 Second, QCs "enhanc[e] work-
ing conditions by allowing workers to exert ... influence over the work
environment."56 The overall goal of a QC is to enhance employee work-
ing conditions. 7 QCs, which have been widely used, usually involve the
least delegation of power to employees. Overall, workers involved in
QCs are able to provide recommendations to management, but do not
possess "substantial decision-making authority."'59
At Ford Motor Company, for example, an employee involvement plan
helped implement QC concepts.6 The employees are trained in various
problem-solving methods and are monitored by a steering committee.6'
These employees make their recommendations to management with a
51. Goldin, supra note 46, at 434 (footnote omitted).
52. See Sockell, supra note 13, at 1002 (explaining that aside from financial concerns,
employers have turned to these participatory programs to satisfy employees' desires for
input into organizational decision-making and to avoid unionization of their workforce).
53. See Robert B. Moberly, The Worker Participation Conundrum: Does Prohibiting
Employer-Assisted Labor Organizations Prevent Labor-Management Cooperation?, 69
WASH. L. REV. 331, 331-32 (1994).
54. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 581; see also Kohler, supra note 33, at 506 (stating that
QCs provide a mechanism for workers to influence the method of product design and how
their work is performed).
55. See Participatory Management, supra note 22, at 1740-41.
56. Ryan, supra note 26, at 581 (footnote omitted); see also Kohler, supra note 33, at
506 (noting that QCs enable workers to have an influence in product design and how they
perform their job).
57. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 581. But see Bainbridge, supra note 45, at 686 (noting
that critics of quality circles observe that QCs allow management to maintain its decision-
making power and control).
58. See Nunn, supra note 34, at 1390-91 (noting that quality circles, along with survey
feedback, are based on suggestion-oriented, problem-solving approaches).
59. Id. at 1391.
60. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 581. The QC element of the program involves a
weekly session between management and labor. See id. At these sessions, management
solicits suggestions from team members with the goal of improving production. See id.; see
also Dicato, supra note 43, at 700-01 (detailing the use of the employee involvement plan
at the Ford Motor Company).
61. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 581. At Ford, this steering committee consists of both
union and management representatives that monitor the team to ensure the successful op-
eration of the program. See id. at 581 n.40.
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large percentage of the suggestions being implemented.62
B. Semi-Autonomous Work Groups
Semi-autonomous work group participatory plans organize workers
into teams, each with its own supervisor elected by the team or provided
by the employer.63 These employees make suggestions on how to im-
prove production and they independently decide which suggestions to
implement." The team's authority includes the ability to decide how
work will be performed, selection of new team members, and scheduling
of overtime for team members. The team members are responsible for
production of a final product or the performance of a major operational
function. 6 The use of semi-autonomous work groups often results in the
greatest delegation of power to workers "involving 'substantial changes
in the basic structure of the organization ... aimed at moving important
decisions into the hands of individuals and teams performing the basic
manufacturing or service work of the company.' 67 This approach, how-
ever, requires the diffusion of authority and decision-making power
throughout the organization. As a consequence, the level of supervi-
sion over the team members is reduced.69
One successful example of a semi-autonomous work group participa-
tory plan is the GM-Toyota New United Motor Plant joint venture.70
62. See id. at 581-82 (illustrating two specific cases at Ford where employee involve-
ment resulted in increased performance and greater worker satisfaction). The QC pro-
gram at Ford has led to a decrease in the number of employee grievances and an increase
in productivity and overall product quality. See id. at 582.
63. See id. at 583. The teams usually consist of between eight to ten employees and
are assembled from workers in the same department. See Dicato, supra note 43, at 698.
Worker autonomy is increased so individuals learn how to perform the jobs of co-workers.
See id.
64. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 583. The effect of this independence is the delegation
of increased responsibility to workers. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Kohler, supra note 33, at 507. The teams may have the responsibility for in-
terviewing and selecting applicants pre-determined by management, appraising the per-
formance of team members, preparing budgets, and monitoring costs related to the team's
duties. See id. at 508.
67. Nunn, supra note 34, at 1391-92 (footnote omitted).
68. See Kohler, supra note 33, at 508. This method of workplace organization is in
direct contradiction to the traditional assembly line. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 583. In-
stead of workers being responsible for only a singular task or function, team members may
have the responsibility to produce a finished product. See id.
69. See Kohler, supra note 33, at 508. The decreased supervision serves to diminish
the distinction between management and labor. See id.
70. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 584. For a detailed discussion of the Toyota and GM
joint venture, see Weiss, supra note 29, at 450-60.
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This program uses teams consisting of five to ten employees, with one
team leader.7 The team determines the most efficient manner to per-
form a certain task. Once this determination is made, other individuals
in the plant perform the job in the same manner.73 The team leader, who
is appointed by management, has the ultimate responsibility for imple-
menting the decisions of the team.74 The large percentage of employees
satisfied with their jobs, the low absenteeism rate among employees,76
and the attainment of high levels of productivity and quality7 7 demon-
strate this program's success.
C. Labor-Management Committees
QCs and semi-autonomous work groups offer all employees the oppor-
tunity to participate directly in the decision-making process. In con-
trast, a labor-management committee is composed of management offi-
cials and workers who may be "elected, volunteered, or selected by
management., 79 The labor-management committee does not deal with
specific issues, but often addresses a wide variety of issues at the depart-
ment or plant level.80
Labor-management committees limit the amount of direct involve-
ment that workers have in organizational decision making." The struc-
ture of the committee itself limits the employees' involvement.8 The
representatives, who may be chosen by employees or management, meet
directly with upper level management to discuss the employees' con-
cerns."' Despite the limited degree of employee involvement, this type of
71. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 584.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See Weiss, supra note 29, at 459 (stating that "[t]he proportion of employees de-
claring themselves satisfied or very satisfied with their employment has risen steadily,
from 76% in 1987, to 85% in 1989, to 90% in 1991").
76. See id. at 434 (finding that the absenteeism rate remained consistent at 3%).
77. See id. (noting that the production and quality levels at the Freemont, California
plant matched the standards set in Toyota's Japanese plants).
78. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 586.
79. See Moe, supra note 42, at 1157.
80. See id.
81. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 586; see also A.B. Cochran, III, We Participate, They
Decide: The Real Stakes in Revising Section 8(a)(2) of the.National Labor Relations Act, 16
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 458, 463 (1995) (discussing the general elements of labor-
management committees).
82. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 586.
83. See id.
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participation plan has had a successful track record, based in part on the
plan's ability to "improv[e] productivity, solv[e] production-related
problems, and prevent[] labor strife by boosting employee morale."'
'
Overall, labor-management committees provide employees the oppor-
tunity to discuss a wide range of issues directly with high-level manage-
ment representatives." Unlike QCs and semi-autonomous work-groups,
the issues are not limited only to "immediate production responsibilities
of those present, or to the conditions in which a particular group con-
ducts its work." 6 Committees often focus on soliciting employee con-
cerns relating to all aspects of employment and improving overall organ-
izational performance.
Characteristics of this plan generally include: (1) an equal proportion
of management and labor representatives on the team; (2) a team set
agenda; (3) team leaders that are composed of one representative from
management and labor respectively; (4) team meetings that occur on a
regular basis; and (5) a large number of employees who are exposed to
the worker participation process through a rotating employee member-
ship&
At AT&T, the implementation of a labor-management committee
eventually developed into an extensive cooperative program.8' This
committee at AT&T led to increased cooperation and interaction be-
tween labor and management.90 In one instance, the AT&T committee
instituted a QC with professional employees, that "led to an increase in
productivity and a decrease in absenteeism for the group involved." 91
There are a wide range of benefits that flow to both management and
labor from the use of worker participation schemes.92 Management gains
include enhanced efficiency in production and the potential to compete
with foreign firms more effectively. 93 Labor achieves increased control of
84. Participatory Management, supra note 22, at 1738-39 (footnote omitted).
85. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 586.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 586-87 (describing also the successful use of a joint labor-management
committee at AT&T).
88. See Moe, supra note 42, at 1157-58.
89. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 587.
90. See id.
91. Id. (footnote omitted).
92. See id. at 587-88.
93. See id.; see also Moberly, supra note 22, at 778-79 (explaining how at Lockheed,
savings from the use of a worker participation scheme were almost four times the operat-
ing cost of the program); cf. Lee, Collective Bargaining Part 1, supra note 41, at 206 (noting
how the interest and use of employee participation plans has heightened, in part, due to
increased foreign competition).
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their workplace and an overall increase in job satisfaction.
The use of these participation plans, however, is not without potential
legal problems.95 The NLRA, in defining what individuals are covered,
never expressly comments on the status of managerial employees.96 Ad-
ditionally, defining a managerial employee's role is the more difficult
task.9' An organization, by granting an employee nominal decision-
making authority, may unintentionally place that employee in a manage-
rial position." The struggle by the Board and courts in defining who is a
managerial employee is a significant obstacle in determining when the
use of certain participation plans will force statutory employees outside
the coverage of the Act.99
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MANAGERIAL EXCLUSION
A. History of the Wagner Act
Enacted in 1935 during the height of the Great Depression, the Wag-
ner Act, which comprised the NLRA prior to its amendment,' was a di-
rect response to the weaknesses of section 7(a) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA).'1 NIRA, enacted by Congress in 1933, "at-
tempted to persuade industry to recognize employee rights to organize
94. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 587.
95. See Lipsky, supra note 39, at 685-86 (describing how the status of a statutory em-
ployee depends on the duties and authority an employee is granted upon joining a worker
participation program); see also Clarence R. Deitsch, Participatory Management And La-
bor Law: A Collision Course?, 38 LAB. L.J. 786, 789-90 (1987) (commenting that the
Court's Yeshiva decision could lead to the development of a test for determining an indi-
vidual's status when that individual is involved in a worker participatory scheme).
96. See Lipsky, supra note 39, at 683 (noting that it is the Board and the courts who
have created the managerial exclusion); see also Lee, Collective Bargaining Part II, supra
note 9, at 275 (asserting that the managerial exclusion is not statutory).
97. See Lee, Collective Bargaining Part II, supra note 9, at 275 (commenting that nei-
ther the Act nor Board decisions have created a clear standard of managerial or supervi-
sory authority).
98. See Harold J. Krent, Note, Collective Authority and Technical Expertise: Reex-
amining the Managerial Employee Exclusion, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 694, 730 (1981) (stating
how a broad interpretation of the Yeshiva decision "might exclude groups of blue-collar
workers exercising minor managerial functions from the protections of the Act").
99. See Deitsch, supra note 95, at 790 (stating that workers, if deemed managerial due
to their involvement in the participation scheme, would no longer be considered an em-
ployee within the Act's definition).
100. See Marion Crain, Building Solidarity Through Expansion of NLRA Coverage: A
Blueprint for Worker Empowerment, 74 MINN. L. REV. 953, 963 n.48 (1990).
101. See S. REP. NO. 74-573, at 4-6 (1935) (stating that problems existing with current
law included its ambiguity, excessive diffusion of administrative responsibility, and lack of
enforcement power vested in the National Labor Relations Board).
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and to bargain collectively. '"'0' The lack of an enforcement mechanism
limited NIRA's effectiveness, as management ignored unions' efforts to
establish collective bargaining agreements. °3 The Wagner Act thus
sought to accomplish two major goals: (1) to reduce industrial strife, and
(2) to balance bargaining power between management and labor to im-
prove economic opportunities and allow more freedom of choice in em-
ployer-employee relationships, thus resulting in economic recovery.104
These goals could be attained through the use of labor-management col-
lective bargaining in the workplace.'5 By establishing the use of collec-
tive bargaining, the Wagner Act gave workers the right to unionize and
bargain collectively over the terms and conditions of their employment.'
6
The Wagner Act set forth certain definitions, declaring who or what
entities were to be afforded statutory protections.' 7 The statute granted
certain protections to employees and defined them as "any employee,...
not.., limited to the employees of a particular employer. 1 8 The defini-
tion of employee did not, however, differentiate between various types of
individuals employed within an organization. 9 The only clear exclusions
from the definition of employee were "individual[s] employed as ... ag-
ricultural laborer[s], or in the domestic service of any family or person at
[their] home, or . . . individual[s] employed by [their] parent[s] or
102. 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 25-26.
103. See id. See generally IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS 172-85 (1970)
(discussing the failure of section 7(a) of the NIRA).
104. See S. REP. No. 74-573, at 1-3. The Senate Committee on Education and Labor
calculated that, "[d]uring the period from 1915 through 1921 there were on the average
3,043 strikes per year, involving the vacating of 1,745,000 jobs and the loss of 50,242,000
working days every 12 months." Id. at 1-2. The Committee also explained how a disparity
in workers' wages "did not permit the masses of consumers to relieve the market of an
ever-increasing flow of goods." Id. at 3.
105. See Crain, supra note 100, at 964; see also HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK
BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY, A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR
POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 31 (1950) (describing the history behind the passage of
the Wagner Act); Casebeer, supra note 3, at 290-91 (noting that state-supported collective
bargaining power would help ameliorate the inequitable distribution of bargaining power
and, in turn, redistribute wealth and improve consumption).
106. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994) (granting to workers the right "to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing").
107. See id. § 152 (definitions section).
108. Id. § 152(3). Congress granted employees "the right to self organiz[e], to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Id. § 157.
109. See Crain, supra note 100, at 970; see also Rabban, supra note 5, at 1782 (noting
that employers argued for the exclusion of managerial and supervisory employees from
the Act based on those employees' relationship with management).
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spouse."1 The Act's coverage, therefore, was intended to extend only to
those workers properly classified as "employees. 1 1
B. Early Determinations of the Wagner Act's Scope of Protection
Soon after the passage of the Wagner Act, the Board faced challenging
issues of interpreting its legislative intent' and establishing appropriate
bargaining units for statutory employees. " ' Initial Board decisions, how-
ever, produced no definitive standards regarding the appropriateness of
114
creating bargaining units consisting only of managerial employees.
1. Excluding Managerial Employees from Rank-and-File Employee
Bargaining Units
The Board's early decisions, although not explicitly excluding manage-
rial employees from the Act, prohibited placement of managerial em-
ployees in bargaining units containing rank-and-file workers.' In Ford
Motor Co.,"16 for example, the Board declared that managerial employees
should be excluded from bargaining units consisting of rank-and-file
workers.17 This exclusion applied to a broad range of employment rela-
110. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49
Stat. 449, 450 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1994)).
111. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 488 (1947) (stating that the
privileges and benefits of the Act are conferred upon employees as defined by section 2(3)
of the NLRA).
112. See Krent, supra note 98, at 697 (stating that the Board faced two competing in-
terests in interpreting the Act: safeguarding workers' rights and the need to protect man-
agement's right to the undivided loyalty of its workers).
113. See NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b); see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 275-76 (1974) (noting that the Board first developed the concept of "managerial
employee" in the course of determining the appropriateness of bargaining units).
114. See Angel, supra note 16, at 419 (describing the Board's practice of only exclud-
ing employees deemed managerial from bargaining units consisting of rank-and-file work-
ers).
115. See Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 N.L.R.B. 1491, 1498 (1944) (excluding expediters from
a unit consisting of clerical, office, technical, and professional employees due to the mana-
gerial nature of the expediters' power); Country Life Press Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1362, 1364
(1943) (stating that the Board's policy has been to exclude general foremen that appear to
posses managerial authority); Julien P. Friez & Sons, 47 N.L.R.B. 43, 47 (1943) (holding
that expediters, because they were closely related to management, were to be excluded
from a bargaining unit consisting of clerical employees); Chicago Rotoprint Co., 45
N.L.R.B. 1263, 1267 (1942) (excluding general foremen from a bargaining unit because
they appeared to possess managerial authority); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 3 N.L.R.B.
431, 437 (1937) (excluding "squadron men" from a unit of production workers because of
their "intimate" relationship with management, even though they were not supervisory).
116. 66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946).
117. See id. at 1322; see also Barrett Div., 65 N.L.R.B. 903, 905 (1946) (stating that as-
sistants to a buyer who exercised a management-like function could not be included in a
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tionships"8 including expediters," 9 assistant buyers, a circulation de-
partment manager,'2 ' and a public relations person. 2
The Board's decision to exclude managerial employees from rank-and-
file units was in part a response to employer concerns. 12' Employers be-
lieved that they were entitled to the undivided loyalties of their man-
agement.124 They argued that, because of their special relationship with
management, managerial employees should be excluded from the Act's
coverage.' They feared that the organization of managerial employees
potentially could divide workers' loyalties "between the competing inter-
ests of unions and management.'
26
Decisions such as Ford Motor Co. produced little guidance, 7 as the
Board never conclusively determined whether managerial employeesS 12812
were outside the scope of the Act's protections. In Dravo Corp.,"9 the
Board even expressly refused to address the issue.3
2. The Inconsistent Treatment of Supervisory Employees Under the
Wagner Act
The Board's inconsistent treatment of supervisors under the Wagner
bargaining unit consisting of office clerical employees); Hudson Motor Car Co., 55
N.L.R.B. 509, 512 (1944) (excluding buyers from clerical unit as "their duties are closely
allied to management, differing materially from those of the other clerical employees").
118. See NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Coop., Inc., 412 F.2d 324,326 n.4 (8th Cir. 1969).
119. See Julien P. Friez & Sons, 47 N.L.R.B. at 47.
120. See J.L. Brandeis & Sons, 54 N.L.R.B. 880, 884, enforcement denied on other
grounds, 145 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1944).
121. See Garden Island Publ'g Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 697, 701 (1965).
122. See Fresno Auto Auction, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 878,879 (1967).
123. See Rabban, supra note 5, at 1782 (noting that employers were concerned about
the loyalty of managerial employees if these employees became part of a rank-and-file
unit).
124. See id. at 1778, 1782.
125. See id. at 1782.
126. Id.
127. See Andrew J. Stites, Comment, Will the Real Managerial Employees Please Stand
Up?, 9 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 92, 96 (1975) (arguing that the Board's interchangeable use of
the terms supervisor, manager, and confidential employee led to confusion).
128. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 276 (1974). The issue of whether
an employee should be excluded from a bargaining unit is a separate consideration from
whether an employee may, along with other like employees, form their own bargaining
unit. See Germana, supra note 10, at 407-08. Determining an appropriate bargaining unit
for an employee "rests upon the relationship between the employee and the other em-
ployees in the group." Id. at 408. "[I]n contrast, the decision to exclude an employee from
the NLRA altogether because she is managerial rests upon the relationship between the
employee and the employer." Id. (footnote omitted).
129. 54 N.L.R.B. 1174 (1944).
130. See id. at 1177.
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Act was just as problematic."' Prior to the Taft-Hartley amendments in
1947, which expressly excluded supervisors from the NLRA's protec-
132tions, the Board, in unfair labor practice proceedings, extended the
Act's protections to workers that possessed certain indicia of supervisory
authority.'33 In the 1942 Union Collieries Coal Co.'34 decision, the Board,
for the first time, considered whether supervisors were entitled to form
their own bargaining it. The Board stated that Congress's exclusion
of only three types of employees from the Act's coverage was a signal
that all other employees, including supervisors, were protected by the
Act. The Board ultimately concluded that the supervisors in question
were within the Act's protections and could therefore, organize into their
own bargaining unit.137 The Board did note, however, that its decision
did not signal an approval of allowing supervisors and their subordinates
to organize into the same collective bargaining unit or as separate bar-
gaining units affiliated with the same union.
Despite the limitation the Board placed on supervisors in its UnionT 139
Collieries decision, that same year the Board, in Godchaux Sugars, Inc.,
131. See Krent, supra note 98, at 697; cf Stites, supra note 127, at 95 (noting that,
based on the broad definition of employee under § 2(3) of the Act, the Board acted with
"caution, uncertainty, and abrupt change" in its policy of excluding supervisors from bar-
gaining units). The Board, in determining the composition of a particular bargaining unit,
often deferred to union determinations of appropriate bargaining units. See id. These
union determinations led to the exclusion of numerous categories of workers, such as
maintenance employees, outside employees, clerical and office workers, and technical and
professional employees. See id. at 95 n.22.
132. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994); see also Daniel Rhodes Barney, Bell Aerospace
and the Status of Managerial Employees Under the NLRA, 1 INDUs. REL. L. J. 346, 353-54
(1976) (discussing how both the House and Senate excluded supervisors, but defined the
term supervisor differently).
133. See, e.g., Warfield Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 58, 64 (1938) (describing the Board's tradi-
tional protection of a union comprised of highly skilled employees, here engineers, "en-
trusted with greater responsibilities than most other employees"); Star Publ'g Co., 4
N.L.R.B. 498, 501, 505-06 (1937) (holding that employees who served as district and
branch mangers, with supervisory duties over the carrier boys, retained status as employ-
ees under section 2(3) of the Act and were protected against retaliatory actions of their
employer).
134. 44 N.L.R.B. 165 (1942), overruled by Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733
(1943).
135. See id. at 167. The Board stated that the supervisors in question (mine foremen
and fire bosses) were "employees" under section 2(2) of the Act. See id.
136. See id. at 167-68; see also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 191 (1941)
(noting that Congress was aware of the problems faced by workers not entitled to a legal
remedy).
137. See Union Collieries, 44 N.L.R.B. at 169.
138. See id.
139. 44 N.L.R.B. 874 (1942).
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determined that a unit of foremen, considered supervisors by the em-
ployer, was entitled to the protections of the Act.140 The Board held that
these foremen could affiliate with the same parent labor union repre-
senting rank-and-file workers, but as a separate bargaining unit consist-
ing only of supervisors.14
The Board, in 1943, reevaluated its recognition of a bargaining unit of
supervisors in Maryland Drydock Co.. 42 The Board expressly overruled
its earlier decisions by denying certification to a bargaining unit consist-
ing of supervisors.143 The Board noted that, although a supervisor may
still be considered an "employee" under the Act, it was no longer appro-
priate to sanction a bargaining unit composed entirely of supervisors.
44
In 1945, the Board reversed itself once again in Packard Motor Car
Co.'45 The Board declared that the foremen employed at Packard Motor
Car could form a separate bargaining unit. The Board reasoned that
foremen could bargain collectively with their employer and still perform
their duties effectively and loyally. 4 1 In a five to four decision, the Su-
preme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's enforcement of the Board's
ruling.'48 The Court determined that the foremen at Packard Motor Car
were entitled to the Act's protections when taking concerted action to
protect their common interests.' The majority held that a bargaining
unit comprised solely of foremen was appropriate under section 9(b) of
140. See id. at 877 (stating that supervisory employees are protected by statute in exer-
cising their organizational and collective bargaining rights).
141. See id. at 878.
142. 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943).
143. See id. at 741-42 (stating that establishment of a unit composed of supervisors
would make collective bargaining difficult and be inconsistent with the policies of the
Act).
144. See id. at 738.
145. 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945), enforced, 157 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1946), aff'd, 330 U.S. 485
(1947).
146. See id. at 26.
147. See id. at 19. The employer believed that a foreman's allegiance to management
would become divided, or possibly lost, if the company was obligated to bargain collec-
tively with these workers. See id. at 18. The Board responded that "the foreman owes no
duty of loyalty to his employer, for in this aspect of his employment relationship, he deals
with management at arms length and must rely ultimately upon his own bargaining power
to gain concessions just as any rank and file employee." Id. at 19.
148. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493,501 (1947), superseded by 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994). Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion. See id. at 486. Justice
Douglas's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Burton. See id. at 493.
Justice Frankfurter joined in Justice Douglas's dissent except for the first section. See id.
at 501.
149. See id. at 490.
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the Act.5
In a strong dissent, Justice Douglas criticized the majority for its failure
to maintain the bright line distinction between management and labor.'
Justice Douglas expressed concern that the majority's decision allowed
for the unionization of virtually all employees within an organization.'
According to Justice Douglas, the majority did not understand the hier-
archical structure of labor relations. '  As a result, Justice Douglas ar-
gued, the majority's decision permitted the unionization of upper man-
agement.'
C. Congressional Response to Packard Motor Car: The Taft-Hartley
Amendments
In response to the Court's decision in Packard Motor Car, Congress
enacted the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act in 1947.1'" The
Taft-Hartley amendments explicitly excluded supervisory employees'56
150. See id. at 491. The Court noted that section 9(b) of the Act gave the Board broad
discretion in fashioning appropriate bargaining units. See id.
151. See id. at 494 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The most important consideration for Jus-
tice Douglas was the maintenance of the traditional separation between labor and man-
agement, a fundamental element of United States industry. See id.; see also Krent, supra
note 98, at 698 n.33. Justice Douglas stated
Over thirty years ago Mr. Justice Brandeis, while still a private citizen, saw the
need for narrowing the gap between management and labor, for allowing labor
greater participation in policy decisions, for developing an industrial system in
which cooperation rather than coercion was the dominant characteristic. In his
view, these were measures of therapeutic value in dealing with problems of in-
dustrial unrest or inefficiency.
The present decision may be a step in that direction. It at least tends to oblit-
erate the line between management and labor.
Packard Motor Car, 330 U.S. at 493-94 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
152. See Packard Motor Car, 330 U.S. at 494. Justice Douglas explained that "if fore-
men are 'employees' within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, so are vice-
presidents, managers, assistant managers, superintendents, assistant superintendents-in-
deed, all who are on the payroll of the company ... with the exception of the directors."
Id.
153. See id. at 493-94; see also Krent, supra note 98, at 698 n.33.
154. See Packard Motor Car, 330 U.S. at 494 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas
concluded that as a result, "management and labor will become more of a solid phalanx
than separate factions in warring camps." Id.
155. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 279 (1974) (noting that Packard
Motor Car was a catalyst for the enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments); Crain, supra
note 100, at 972 (stating that Congress responded to the Packard dissent by enacting Taft-
Hartley in 1947).
156. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994). Supervisory employees are defined as
individual[s] having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effec-
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from the coverage of the Act.157 Congress limited the supervisory exclu-
sion, however, by requiring the employee to act "in the interest of theS 158
employer" before being deemed a supervisor. The Taft-Hartley
amendments did include professionals as statutory employees, thus en-
suring that not all workers exercising independent judgment and discre-
tion were outside the Act's protections. 9 The amendments, however,
did not mention the term "managerial employee" within the statutory
definition of employee'
Congress, in response to the Packard Motor Car decision, determined
that the Board's interpretation of the term "employee," which included
individuals exercising managerial authority, may have been too broad .
tively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise
of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use
of independent judgment.
Id. § 152(11).
157. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61
Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187). The House and Senate
versions of the supervisory exclusion differed in the amount of authority an individual
could exercise before being deemed a supervisor. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 279-80.
The Senate bill established a narrower category of duties that would classify an individual
as a supervisor. See id. at 280. The Senate version reflected the belief "that employees
such as 'straw bosses,' who had only minor supervisory duties, should be included within
the Act's protections." Id. at 281. The Conference Committee adopted the Senate ver-
sion, thus limiting the scope of the supervisory exclusion. See id. at 282.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
159. See Rabban, supra note 5, at 1797-99 (noting that inclusion of professionals within
the Taft-Hartley amendments was a compromise between the desires of unions to organ-
ize professionals, who they thought were no different from other white collar employees,
and the desires of professional associations, which sought to distinguish professionals from
clerical and industrial workers). Section 152(12) defines a "professional employee" as
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in
character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work;
(ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its perform-
ance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished
cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring
knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily ac-
quired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in
an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general
academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training in the perform-
ance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes; or
(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual
instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is per-
forming related work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify
himself to become a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).
29 U.S.C. § 152(12).
160. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
161. Cf. S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 3-4 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 407, 409-10 (1985)
[hereinafter 1 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1947] (noting that the Board's definition of
[48:557
The Managerial Exclusion
S 162As a result, Congress expressly excluded supervisory employees. The
language suggests, however, that Congress also may have believed that
the need for an express "managerial exclusion" was unnecessary, because
individuals exercising less responsibility than managerial employees were
already ineligible for the Act's protections via the supervisory exclu-
sion.
D. The Implied Managerial Exclusion
Taft-Hartley's ambiguous treatment of managerial employees forced
the Board to determine the scope of the explicit supervisory and implicit
managerial exclusions.'6 After the passage of the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments in 1947, the Board, in Denver Dry Goods Co.,"' excluded from
bargaining units workers whose interests were "more closely identified
with those of management."' '  Following its decision in Denver Dry
Goods, the Board again reiterated its pre-1947 policy of excluding
"managerial employees" from bargaining units composed of other em-
ployees.67 The Board, however, did not completely deny managerial
employee could "be used to unionize even vice presidents since they are not specifically
exempted from the category of 'employees"'); see also Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 281.
162. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
163. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 13-17 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, 1947, supra note 161, at 292, 304-08; S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 3-5 (1947), reprinted
in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1947, supra note 161, at 407, 409-11. In discussing
the exclusion of confidential employees from the protections of the Act, Congress noted
"Im]ost of the people who would qualify as 'confidential' employees are executives and
are excluded from the act in any event." H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 23, reprinted in 1 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1947, supra note 161, at 292, 314 (emphasis added); see also Bell
Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 283-84.
Congressional oversight or an implicit approval of the Board's prior treatment of mana-
gerial employees may have been some of the reasons for the omission of an express mana-
gerial employee exclusion. See Krent, supra note 98, at 699.
164. See Krent, supra note 98, at 700 (noting how Taft-Hartley required the Board to
first determine who was a managerial employee and then to decide what protections these
managerial employees were afforded under the Act); see also NLRB v. Hearst Publica-
tions, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) (holding that "the Board's determination that speci-
fied persons are 'employees' under this Act is to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the rec-
ord' and a reasonable basis in the law").
165. 74 N.L.R.B. 1167 (1947).
166. Id. at 1175.
167. See Barney, supra note 132, at 357 (discussing Supreme Court cases that reviewed
post-1947 Board decisions). For example, in Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75
N.L.R.B. 320, 323 & n.4 (1947), the Board stated that it had, "in the past, and before the
passage of the recent amendments to the Act, recognized and defined as 'managerial' em-
ployees, executives who formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and
making operative the decisions of their employer, and ha[d] excluded such managerial
employees from bargaining units." Id. (citations omitted). The Board said in reference to
the Taft-Hartley Act, that "[wie believe that the Act, as amended, contemplates the con-
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employees the protection of the Act; rather, it only excluded them from
168bargaining units consisting of non-managerial employees.169
In Swift & Co., however, decided in 1956, the Board declared that a
separate bargaining unit of individuals representing management was in-
appropriate. Such individuals, the Board concluded, "cannot be
deemed to be employees for the purposes of the Act.",7' The Board,
over the next fourteen years, consistently applied the managerial exclu-
sion, denying managerial employees bargaining rights under the Act.
7 1
During this time period, the federal courts of appeals also approved the
Board's construction of the managerial exclusion. 73
tinuance of this practice." Id.; see also Denton's Inc., 83 N.L.R.B. 35, 37 (1949) (excluding
buyers and assistant buyers from a bargaining unit because their "interests ... [we]re more
closely identified with management than with the other employees in the store").
168. See Barney, supra note 132, at 357-58 (stating that the Board did not definitively
exclude managerial employees from the Act's coverage); see also Titeflex, Inc., 103
N.L.R.B. 223, 225-26 (1953) (excluding from a bargaining unit a buyer deemed manage-
rial because of his authority to commit the employer's credit by placing orders with a ven-
dor from an approved list); Western Elec. Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 420, 423 (1952) (concluding
that a buying assistant who had the authority to commit the employer for purchases of ma-
terials was managerial and could not be included in the bargaining unit); East Coast Fish-
eries, Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 1261, 1263-64 (1952) (holding that long distance truck drivers who
have the power to pledge their employer's credit are managerial employees excluded from
a bargaining unit of other employees). But see Wilson & Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1388, 1393
(1952) (reasoning that certain assistant managers, who had freedom to exercise consider-
able discretion, were not managerial employees because their decisions had to conform
"to the Employer's established policies" and they were not able to formulate or effectuate
management policy).
169. 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956), overruled by North Ark. Elec. Coop., Inc., 185 N.L.R.B.
550 (1970), enforcement denied, 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971).
170. See id. at 753. The Board concluded that Congress clearly intended to exclude
employees with management-like duties from the Act's protections. See id. at 753-54.
171. Id. at 754. The Board went on to reaffirm its position, saying "that representa-
tives of management may not be accorded bargaining rights under the Act." Id.; cf
American Locomotive Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 115, 116-17 (1950) (determining that buyers, as
representatives of management, would not be included in a unit of clerical workers nor
"be accorded bargaining rights under the Act").
172. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 287-89 (1974) (noting that the
Board has stated its understanding of the Act as denying managerial employees any bar-
gaining rights, whether in a separate unit or otherwise).
173. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th Cir. 1970)
(applying the Board standard to determine managerial status for purposes of excluding
such employees); Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n. v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(stating the standard used by the Board in determining what is a managerial employee has
been based upon "the reasonable belief that Congress intended to exclude from the pro-
tection of the Act those who comprised a part of 'management' or were allied with it on
the theory that they were the one from whom the workers needed protection") (emphasis
added); International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 116, 123 (2d.
Cir. 1964) (noting that, even though the Act does not expressly exclude managerial em-
ployees, "under a Board policy of long duration, this category of personnel has been ex-
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In practice, though, the Board held only twice during this same period
"that managerial employees could not be afforded protection under the
Act." '174 More often, the Board excluded these employees from the pro-
posed bargaining units because, as managerial employees, they were not
part of a "community of interest" with the rank-and-file employees.
This "community of interest" test became a tool for the Board in de-
termining the appropriateness of placing managerial employees within
the same bargaining unit as rank-and-file workers."' It enabled the
Board, when it decided North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc.'77 in
1970, to alter once again its position regarding managerial employees.
The Board determined that, although an employee was deemed to be
managerial, he was still within the statutory protections of the Act be-
cause he was not considered to be an employer.7 9 The Board noted that
it had created the managerial employee category and that it was not ex-
pressly provided for by the Act; thus, the Board had more latitude in de-
fining the exclusion's parameters.'9 The Board stated that managerial
employees would be entitled to the protections of the Act unless it could
cluded from the protection of the Act").
174. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 309 (White, J., dissenting); see also Angel, supra
note 16, at 435 (stating that the Board held managerial employees were excluded from the
Act only twice; in American Locomotive, Inc. and Swift & Co.); supra notes 169-72 and
accompanying text (discussing two cases during the fourteen year period completely de-
nying managerial employees the protections of the Act).
175. See, e.g., North Ark. Elec. Coop., Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550, 550 (1970), enforcement
denied, 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that managerial employees are not protected
by Act at all); cf. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 817, 822 (1958) (determining
that buyers, as managerial employees, were to be excluded from bargaining units of tech-
nical employees, without commenting on the extension of the Act's protections to them);
Diana Shop, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 743, 745 (1957) (excluding credit managers, as managerial
employees, from unit of part-time employees without determining whether managerial
employees could potentially organize into their own bargaining unit), overruled by North
Ark. Elec. Coop., Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970), enforcement denied, 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir.
1971); Mack Trucks, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 1576, 1577-78 (1956) (holding merely that buyers,
as managerial employees, were to be excluded from a bargaining unit of office clerical
employees without discussing whether they were protected by the Act). For a discussion
detailing the application of the "community of interest" test applied by the Board, see
ROBERT A. GORMAN, BAStC TEXT ON LABOR LAW § 2, at 68-69 (1976).
176. See North Ark. Elec. Coop., 185 N.L.R.B. at 550.
177. 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970), enforcement denied, 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971) (hold-
ing that managerial employees are not protected by Act at all).
178. See id. at 550. The Board noted that in bargaining unit cases involving a determi-
nation of whether an individual is a managerial employee, the "concern has been whether
certain nonsupervisory employees have a sufficient community of interest with the general
group or class of employees constituting the bulk of a unit so that they may appropriately
be considered a part thereof." Id.
179. See id. at 550-51.
180. See id. at 550.
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be shown that they participated "in the formulation, determination, or
effectuation of policy with respect to employee relations matters.18
E. Resolving the Managerial Exclusion under Bell Aerospace
The ability of managerial employees' to organize was finally rejected in
Bell Aerospace, when the Supreme Court declared that these individuals
clearly were outside the protection of the Act.8 2 Initially, the Board de-
termined that buyers in the company's purchasing and procurement de-
partment, even if managerial employees, were protected by the Act.'83
Under the Board's exclusionary test, two requirements needed to be met:
First, in order for an employee to be considered managerial,
he had to possess authority that was derived from the employer.
Second, in order for the employee's managerial status to ex-
clude him, his authority had to involve labor relations, or for
some other reason had to present the possibility that union
membership could create a conflict of interest.'8 4
In denying a motion for reconsideration, the Board stated that when
there is only a minimal opportunity for divided loyalties and conflicts of
interest, managerial employees would not be denied the right to organize
and collectively bargain.
8 1
The Supreme Court rejected the Board's narrow reading of the mana-
gerial employee exclusion.'8 The Court began by stating that Congress
181. Id. at 551. The Board, in an attempt to clarify its method of bargaining unit de-
termination, noted that an employee's exclusion from a bargaining unit, b/ecause of his
lack of community of interest, is not determinative of his status as an employee protected
by the Act. See id. at 550.
182. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974).
183. See Bell Aerospace Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 431, 431-32 (1971). The Board, based on
its decision in North Arkansas Electric, determined that, even if the buyers in question
were "managerial employees," still they were entitled to the protection and full benefits of
the Act. See id. at 431.
184. George Feldman, Workplace Power and Collective Activity: The Supervisory and
Managerial Exclusions in Labor Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 525, 546 (1995).
185. See Bell Aerospace Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 827, 828 (1972). The Board made this de-
termination even after considering the Eighth Circuit's decision to reject the Board's ex-
tension of coverage to managerial employees in North Arkansas Electric. See id. at 827.
186. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 289. The case came before the Supreme Court on
appeal, after the Second Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's ruling which had re-
quired the company to bargain with the unit of buyers. See Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB,
475 F.2d 485, 497 (2d Cir. 1973), affd, 416 U.S. 267 (1974). The Second Circuit's formula-
tion of managerial authority, in contrast to the Board's formulation, excluded employees
'so closely related to or aligned with management as to place the employee in a
position of conflict of interest between his employer on the one hand and his
fellow workers on the other' but also one who is 'formulating, determining and
effectuating his employer's policies or has discretion, independent of an em-
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clearly had intended to remove from statutory protections all employees
deemed managerial.187 The majority then discussed the legislative history
of the Taft-Hartley amendments.'s Next, the majority noted Congress's
belief that an express exclusion was unnecessary for certain employees
who were so clearly outside the protections of the Act.18 9 The Court con-
cluded that based on the history of the Act and the Board's prior deci-
sions, managerial employees were not protected under the Act.19°
The dissent ' argued that the Board never had held managerial em-
ployees to be outside the protection of the Act during the period prior to
the Taft-Hartley amendments. 92 The dissent concluded that relying on
congressional silence and a single Board decision excluding managerial
employees was an insufficient reason for the majority to extend the ex-
clusion to all managerial employees in the future.193 Despite the dissent's
argument, the holding in Bell Aerospace has had far-reaching effects. 94
F. The Professional Employee: Determining Their Status Under the Act
The decision in Bell Aerospace, which dealt specifically with manage-
rial employees, has also affected the status of individuals classified as
professionals.'9 The Taft-Hartley amendments specifically defined a
ployer's established policy, in the performance of his duties.'
Id. at 494 (quoting Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 41 (7th Cir.
1969)).
187. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 275.
188. See id. at 283-84.
189. See id. at 284 (quoting the statement from the Court of Appeals decision that
"Congress failed to enact the portion of Mr. Justice Douglas's Packard dissent relating to
the organization of executives, not because it disagreed but because it deemed this unnec-
essary").
190. See id. at 289-90; see also Feldman, supra note 184, at 554 (stating that the deci-
sion in Bell Aerospace disqualified any employee from the Act's protections because of
their ability to formulate and effectuate policy).
191. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 295 (White, J., dissenting in part). Justice White
was joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall. See id.
192. See id. at 300.
193. See id. at 310-11.
194. See infra notes 213-37 and accompanying text (describing the extension of the
managerial exclusion to professional employees and those individuals who expressly bar-
gain for more authority in the workplace).
195. See Rabban, supra note 5, at 1814-15 (noting how the dissent in Bell Aerospace
triggered the holding in Yeshiva, where the majority identified professionals as managerial
employees and excluded them from the Act's coverage). Professional employees are de-
fined as engaging in work that "is 'predominantly intellectual' and... involves 'the consis-
tent exercise of discretion and judgment."' Id. at 1799. This definition distinguishes pro-
fessionals from managers because of the Bell Aerospace decision. See, e.g., Shayne Bros.,
Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. 113 (1974). The Board stated:
The Board has generally sought to exclude from employee units those em-
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professional employee. 96 This definition responded to the congressional
concern that professional and nonprofessional employees remain in
separate bargaining units and "not whether professional employees per-
formed managerial duties.' 9 As a consequence of Congress statutorily
defining professional employees, the Board faced the challenge of differ-
entiating between managerial, supervisory, and professional employ-
198
ees.
This difficulty arose because professional employees, defined as those
who exercise independent judgment in performing their jobs, were
granted the protections of the Act.'99 Moreover, Board decisions illus-
trating this view have held that even professional employees possessing
certain indicia of managerial authority, in the course of their professional
duties, were not necessarily excluded as managerial or supervisory em-
ployees who, while not supervisory, were so closely allied or identified with man-
agement that their interests warranted exclusion from the protection of the Act.
Those employees who formulate, determine, and effectuate an employer's poli-
cies, and who exhibit sufficient discretion in the performance of their duties to
indicate that they are not merely following established employer policy have
been held by the Board to be managerial employees.
Id. at 113-14 (footnotes omitted). This test is applied in the conjunctive, in that all ele-
ments must be met before an individual will be deemed a managerial employee. See id.
Thus, a professional that does not participate in policy making may not be a managerial
employee, even though he exercises significant independent judgment and discretion in his
work. See Rabban, supra note 5, at 1797-1801.
196. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1994).
197. See Lee, Collective Bargaining Part II, supra note 9, at 279; see also Rabban, supra
note 5, at 1797-98.
198. See, e.g., Sutter Community Hosp., 227 N.L.R.B. 181, 193 (1976) (stating that
"professional employees are not the same as management employees merely because their
professional competence necessarily involves a consistent exercise of discretion and judg-
ment in a manner which may affect an employer's business direction or established pol-
icy").
199. See Feldman, supra note 184, at 539 (discussing the professional employee cate-
gory). In Sutter Community Hospitals, the Board laid out the test for professional status.
227 N.L.R.B. at 193. The Board stated that "[t]he touchstone in a given case is whether or
not a professional employee either exercises the type of discretion indicative of managerial
status or, having some responsibility for authorship, participates directly in the employer's
policymaking process." Id.; cf Sockell, supra note 13, at 993 (explaining how the language
used to define a professional, who is covered by the Act, is "remarkably similar" to the
language used in describing a supervisory employee, who is not protected by the Act).
The Board addressed the treatment of professional employees who exercised independent
discretion in making professional judgments in General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851
(1974). The Board conceded that work performed in a professional manner "necessarily
involves a consistent exercise of discretion and judgment." Id. at 857. The Board contin-
ued, however, by declaring that professional employees are not managerial employees,
"either by definition or in authority," as managerial authority does not necessarily follow
with the exercise of discretion. Id.
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ployees. The Taft-Hartley amendments, however, prevented the
Board from placing professional and nonprofessional employees in the
same bargaining unit "unless a majority of such professional employees
vote[d] for inclusion in such unit." ' ' Further, even though technically
within the protection of the Act, the managerial exclusion has been used
to prevent the organization of individuals classically termed "profes-
sional".2 °2
Within the academic setting, faculty members exercise professional
authority by acting as a group in making decisions regarding student ad-
mission, curriculum, academic standards, and matters of faculty status.0 3
This professional authority "derives from expertise and 'tends to be advi-
sory or recommendatory. '' 20 4 If faculty members, however, make these
collective decisions individually, the faculty members might be vulner-
able to being deemed as exercising managerial authority.2°5 As a result,
faculty who make these collective decisions may acquire managerial or
supervisory status based on their collective exercise of authority, and
thereby be excluded from the protections of the Act. °6
In 1971, the Board asserted jurisdiction over a private university in de-
termining whether faculty who exercised collective authority were mana-
gerial or supervisory employees. "In C.W. Post Center, the university
200. See, e.g., General Dynamics, 213 N.L.R.B. at 857-58 (finding that "managerial
authority is not vested in professional employees merely by virtue of their professional
status"); Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1132, 1134, 1136 (1948) (holding that
some attorneys, even when acting for management, do not lose protections of the Act nor
the right to self-organization).
201. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1994).
202. See infra notes 213-16 and accompanying text (describing the extension of the
managerial exclusion to professionals in the academic sector). See also Sockell, supra note
13, at 994 (noting that in addition to academics, other professionals, such as nurses, archi-
tects, and engineers, could be excluded from the Act under the approach used in Yeshiva);
cf., e.g., FHP, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 1141, 1141-42 (1985) (holding that full-time staff physi-
cians and dentists, who served on staff committees, were managerial employees based on
their possession and exercise of authority to formulate and effectuate management poli-
cies). But see Montefiore Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 261 N.L.R.B. 569, 570 (1982) (holding that
"[o]nly if the activities of professional employees fall outside the scope of the duties rou-
tinely performed by similarly situated professionals will they be found aligned with man-
agement").
203. See, e.g., C.W. Post Ctr., 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 905 (1971).
204. See Rabban, supra note 5, at 1809.
205. See id. at 1807.
206. See Sockell, supra note 13, at 993-94; see also Finkin, supra note 12, at 613 (noting
that the Board, in Cornell University, referred to the faculty's role as a group, in making
decisions dealing with "curriculum, admissions, degree requirements, and other matters of
the educational program", as being "quasi-supervisory").
207. See C.W. Post, 189N.L.R.B. at 905.
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challenged the creation of a faculty bargaining unit, claiming that faculty
members exercised sufficient authority to qualify them as supervisors or
managerial employees under the Act."2"8 The Board determined that,
because the faculty members exercised only their policy-making and su-
pervisory authority as a group, they were not supervisory or managerial
employees, but rather professional employees entitled to the Act's pro-
tections. °9
Other Board decisions supporting faculty organization relied on a
similar justification.20 Eventually, the Board applied a three-step test to
university faculty cases in determining the status of the individuals who
sought to bargain collectively.211 The Board's three-step test asked
whether "(i) faculty authority is collective, (ii) it is exercised in the fac-
ulty's own interest rather than in the interest of the university, and (iii)
final authority rests with the board of trustees.,
212
The Supreme Court reversed this Board precedent by extending the
managerial exclusion into the academic professional sector in NLRB v.
Yeshiva University.213 In Yeshiva, a unit of full-time faculty members at a
214private university sought certification as a bargaining unit. The univer-
sity refused to bargain with this faculty unit on the grounds that the fac-
ulty members were managerial employees and outside the Act's statu-
215
tory protections.
208. Albert G. Bixler, Comment, Industrial Democracy and the Managerial Employee
Exception to the National Labor Relations Act, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 441,446 (1985).
209. See C.W. Post, 189 N.L.R.B. at 905; accord Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648
(1972) (finding that faculty members with some measure of quasi-collegial authority still
are entitled to the protection of the Act); Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134, 135 (1971)
(holding that faculty members who exercise their role in school policy determinations as a
group are protected by the Act). In both C. W. Post and Fordham, the Board decided that
the faculty collectively exercising authority removed them from the managerial and super-
visory categories. NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 684 n.18 (1980). For a list of
factors that the Board used in determining if faculty members were managerial employees
in light of union organizing campaigns see Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 684-85.
210. See Rabban, supra note 5, at 1806 (noting that the Board traditionally treated
faculty as covered professionals because the faculty exercised decisionmaking authority
"on a collective rather than individual basis"); see also, e.g., Northeastern Univ., 218
N.L.R.B. 247, 250 (1975) (holding that faculty members would be permitted to bargain
collectively under the protections of the Act because the "faculty participation in collegial
decision-making is on a collective rather than individual basis"); University of Miami, 213
N.L.R.B. 634, 634 (1974) (same); Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. 641, 643 (1973) (same).
211. See Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 684-85.
212. Id. at 685.
213. 444 U.S. 672, 688-91 (1980). There was an outpouring of criticism following the
Yeshiva decision. See Sockell, supra note 13, at 994 & n.26.
214. See Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 674.
215. See id. at 675.
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The Supreme Court rejected the Board's contention that the Yeshiva
216faculty, as professionals, were not managerial employees. According to
the Court, the faculty's interest in advancing their professional careers
through collective authority could not be separated from the interests of
217the university. This collective authority, the Court found, was exer-
cised by individual faculty members who served on faculty welfare com-
mittees that determined "curriculum, [the] grading system, admission
and matriculation standards, academic calendars, and course sched-
ules., 21' The Court analogized the faculty's duties to those of managers
in an industrial setting.219 The Court reasoned that Yeshiva University
was a mature institution, with the faculty collectively sharing in the de-
termination and implementation of management policy.220 The Court
concluded that the situation at the university could lead to the problem
of divided loyalties, a harm that the Board traditionally sought to
avoid.221
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Yeshiva, argued that the Board, not the
Court, must evaluate the changing nature of industrial relations in de-
termining the scope of the Act's coverage. 222 Justice Brennan believed
that, unlike the Board, the majority did not recognize how a university's
authority structure differs greatly from an industrial setting where mana-
gerial employees are clearly identifiable.2 3 He noted further that an em-
ployee's status rests on the determination of whether the employee is
acting in his own interest or in the interests of his employer.2 Next, Jus-
216. See id. at 688.
217. See id.
218. Id. at 676 (footnote omitted).
219. See id. at 686. The Court believed that the controlling consideration was that the
faculty at Yeshiva exercised authority which was unquestionably managerial in nature and
scope. See id.
220. See id. at 680 (noting that Yeshiva adhered to a system of shared authority, where
the faculty maintained the tradition of collegiality). The decision, however, limited the
reach of the faculty exclusion only to those institutions similar in structure to Yeshiva
University. See id. at 690-91 n.31; cf. Ithaca College, 261 N.L.R.B. 577, 578-79 (1982)
(holding that full-time faculty at a private university were managerial employees based on
their extensive authority in formulating and effectuating academic policy, as well as on
their ability to control the hiring of other faculty).
221. See Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 689-90. The divided loyalty argument was first men-
tioned in Packard, where Justice Douglas spoke of the dangers of the employer's "arms
and legs" being sympathetic to workers in the union, while at the same time directing
them. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 495-97 (1947) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
222. See Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 692-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
223. See id. at 694.
224. See id. at 695-96. Justice Brennan explained it this way:
1999]
Catholic University Law Review
tice Brennan noted how universities are characterized by two formal de-
cision-making structures, where one chain of command implements uni-
versity policy, while the other system allows separate faculty input into
administrative decisions."' It is within this system that faculty, although
acting collectively, seek to further their professional interest and not that
• 226
of their employer. Justice Brennan concluded that the Court did not
evaluate Yeshiva's faculty in light of the unique authority structure that
• . 227
exists in the modern university.
G. Career Enhancement Resulting in Exclusionary Effects on Workers
The ability to have a greater voice within the workplace is a benefit
that workers value highly.2 8 This increased responsibility, however,
could potentially cause an individual to lose his or her "employee" status
under the Act, 229 because managerial status is premised on the duties and
authority that an individual possesses in carrying out a job.23 ° Underlying
If his actions are undertaken for the purpose of implementing the employer's
policies, then he is accountable to management and may be subject to conflicting
loyalties. But if the employee is acting only on his own behalf and in his own in-
terest, he is covered under the Act and is entitled to the benefits of collective
bargaining.
Id. at 696.
225. See id. at 696-97. Justice Brennan characterized this system as containing parallel
decision-making structures, with primary authority vested in the administration and a sec-
ondary network of professional expertise. See id.; see also Kenneth Kahn, The NLRB and
Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking Through Adjudication, 21 UCLA L. REV.
63, 70 (1973) (noting how higher education in the United States is characterized by a sys-
tem of shared authority between faculty and university administrators); Krent, supra note
98, at 709 n.103 (commenting that some sociologists argue that faculty and university ad-
ministrators exercise effective authority through a shared power structure).
226. See Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 697 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding that faculty
make recommendations "to serve [their] own independent interest[s] in creating the most
effective environment for learning, teaching, and scholarship"); see also Bixler, supra note
208, at 449 (commenting that the dissent in Yeshiva believed that the faculty furthered its
own professional interest, not the administration's, by exercising its collective authority).
227. See Yeshiva at 702-03. Justice Brennan noted that education today is "big busi-
ness" which has resulted in the "erosion of the faculty's role in the institution's decision-
making process." Id. at 703.
228. See Kafker, supra note 6, at 710 (arguing that benefits to the organization include
"a more flexible, responsible and productive workforce").
229. See John Hoerr, The Payoff From Teamwork: The Gains in Quality are Substan-
tial-So Why Isn't it Spreading Faster?, Bus. WK., July 10, 1989, at 56. One reason that
use of employee involvement programs may be limited is that managers are hesitant to
share power with employees. See id. at 57. American use of these programs often leads to
employees "tak[ing] over managerial duties, such as work and vacation scheduling, or-
dering materials, and hiring new members." Id. at 58.
230. See Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 682-83 (concluding that "an employee may be excluded
as managerial only if he represents management interests by taking or recommending dis-
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this assumption, however, is the belief that an employee would not
knowingly bargain away his protection under the Act in return for
greater management participation."'
Although not specifically addressed by Yeshiva, the potential exists for
faculty members, not ordinarily exercising managerial authority, to effec-
tively bargain themselves out of the Act's coverage by seeking more in-
put in the policymaking decisions of the university.232 In College of Os-
teopathic Medicine and Surgery (COMS),233 the Board said that the
manner in which a faculty bargaining unit acquired managerial power
was irrelevant to an exclusion determination.2" The Board held that
once faculty gained managerial authority, regardless of the manner in
which it was acquired, the faculty who possessed it would be excluded
from the protections of the Act.
2 35
This holding demonstrated the Board's consistent policy of ignoring
the source of managerial authority in applying the Yeshiva test.236 Under
this analysis, worker participation schemes, in which employees actively
bargain for more authority in the workplace, could result in individuals
correspondingly losing the Act's protections.237
The potential for employees, normally protected by the Act, to lose
the Act's protections due to the nature of their relationship with man-
agement was illustrated in Anamag. Here the Board had to determine
whether individuals serving as team leaders for a worker participation
scheme in an industrial setting were excludable under the Act as supervi-239
sors. The employer utilized six teams to organize its production em-ployees.2 0 The Board concluded that the team leaders were not supervi-
cretionary actions that effectively control or implement employer policy").
231. See Natalie Marshall, Labor-Management Cooperation and the NLRA, 45 LAB.
L.J. 539, 553 (1994) (stating that collective bargaining over issues such as employee par-
ticipation schemes is entirely voluntary, where either side can end the discussions if they
choose).
232. See Bixler, supra note 208, at 454.
233. 265 N.L.R.B. 295 (1982).
234. See id. at 298.
235. See id.
236. See Bixler, supra note 208, at 453.
237. See Lee, Collective Bargaining Part H, supra note 9, at 283 (noting that "the more
power a group of unionized professional employees has to recommend or make important
decisions, the more likely the employees are to be found managerial").
238. 284 N.L.R.B. 621 (1987).
239. See id. at 621.
240. See id. The team consists of rank-and file employees, who serve as team mem-
bers. See id. These team members, by a majority vote, elect one individual to serve as the
team leader for an indefinite time period. See id. Management did not interfere with the
team leader selection process and allowed the team leader to serve solely at the will of the
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sors for purposes of the Act and were eligible for inclusion in an appro-
• • • . 241
priate bargaining unit.
The Board found that the degree of power and authority exercised by
the team leaders did not qualify them as supervisors under section 2(11)
of the Act.242 The Board noted that the team, not just its leader, partici-•• 243
pated in the implementation of company policy. The Board held that
the team's power to reject a decision or the explicit guidelines set forth
by the employer acted to balance the power of a team leader to imple-
ment a decision.2 44 Even though the team leaders in Anamag were found
to be "statutory employees" under the Act, however, the broad scope of
the managerial exclusion still presents the potential to exclude a large
number of rank-and-file workers from the protections of the Act.
III. THE SCOPE OF THE MANAGERIAL EXCLUSION
The managerial exclusion has a broad range of potential applications.24'5
It has been implicated not only in the typical industrial setting,24' but also
in an academic setting to disqualify professional employees from the
Act's coverage.247 This exclusion, which Congress may never have con-
members. See id. The teams' duties involved deciding on personnel functions, such as dis-
cipline, job and overtime assignments, and employee evaluations. See id.
241. See id. at 621.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 622.
244. See id.
245. See David P. Twomey, Comment, NLRB v. Yeshiva University: Faculty as Mana-
gerial Employees Under the NLRA, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 63, 71 (1981). The Yeshiva decision
could provide employers with the ability to exclude a wide range of professional employ-
ees from collectively bargaining under the Act. See id. Professionals who might be af-
fected "include engineers, physicians, lawyers, reporters, editors, and symphony orchestra
musicians." Id.; see also Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publ'g Co. v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 52, 55
(10th Cir. 1973) (holding that an editorial writer was a managerial employee because of
her active participation in "'formulating, determining and effectuating' the newspaper's
journalistic policies"). But see Northeast Utils. Serv. Corp. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 621, 626 (1st
Cir. 1994) (holding that Senior Pool Coordinators, who are in charge of shifts by monitor-
ing electricity needs, were not managerial employees); Noranda Aluminum, Inc. v. NLRB,
751 F.2d 268, 269-70 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that nurses were not managerial employees
and, therefore, entitled to the Act's protections); Loretto Heights College v. NLRB, 742
F.2d 1245, 1252 (10th Cir. 1984) (concluding that faculty members, who participated in a
wide range of decision-making, were not managerial employees because their role did not
"rise to the level of 'effective recommendation or control,"' therefore, they were entitled
to the Act's protections).
246. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1974) (holding that buy-
ers might fall into the managerial employee definition).
247. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980) (concluding that "the fac-
ulty of Yeshiva University exercise authority which in any other context unquestionably
would be managerial").
[48:557
The Managerial Exclusion
templated,248 will impact the current status of labor-management rela-
tions because of the advantages and increasing popularity of worker par-
141ticipation programs.
As the effectiveness and popularity of worker participation schemes
grows, so may the scope of the managerial exclusion. 2' ° Application of
the managerial exclusion to these programs could hinder the effective-
ness of participatory programs, as well as the legal protections enjoyed
by workers involved in these programs. 5' The Constitution, which as-
signed Congress, not the courts or the Board, the duty to create a federal
labor policy might allow Congress to prevent such an extension. Such
intervention may be unlikely, as the Board and the courts, not Congress,
253have created the managerial exclusion.
Additionally, Board decisions regarding managerial employees have
248. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 297, 299 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that
"[w]ithout more, it could not be concluded that Congress meant to exclude a whole cate-
gory of employees in addition to those expressly excepted in [section] 2(3) . . . at least
where Congress was careful to define precisely what employees were within the scope of
the supervisory exclusion").
249. Cf. Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 13, at 13 (noting how the Department of La-
bor has embarked on a study to determine the potential conflict between the use of
worker participation programs and federal labor laws).
250. See Kenneth 0. Alexander, Worker Participation and the Law: Two Views and
Comment, 36 LAB. L.J. 428, 432 (1985) (noting that after the Yeshiva decision, individuals
involved in worker participation schemes may be considered managerial employees); see
also BLOCK, supra note 28, at 58 (noting that at the Ford Sharonville transmission plant,
"[t]he company has been quite willing to share its management prerogatives with the un-
ion" which has blurred "the line between hourly workers and supervisors").
251. See William B. Gould IV, Reflections on Workers' Participation, Influence, and
Powersharing: The Future of Industrial Relations, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 381, 386-87 (1989);
see also David J. Woolf, The Legality of Employee Participation in Unionized Firms: The
Saturn Experience and Beyond, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBs. 557, 579 (1994) (com-
menting how the high level of worker participation at General Motors' Saturn Plant has
resulted in more union members assuming management positions).
252. See 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1994). Section 141(b) states:
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in
their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures
for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to
protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organiza-
tions whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the
part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the
general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor
disputes affecting commerce.
Id.
253. See John William Gergacz & Charles E. Krider, NLRB v. Yeshiva University:
The End of Faculty Unions?, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 891, 894 (1980) (noting how the
managerial exclusion, which was not mentioned in the Act or its legislative history, is
based on the Court's decision in Bell Aerospace).
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been inconsistent, in part due to a lack of legislative history expressly ex-
254
cluding managerial employees. Furthermore, even if Congress in
tended this exclusion to apply in certain settings,"' based on the Board's
precedent, a larger percentage of the workforce could be excluded as
managerial employees. 21' As a result, the decision in Yeshiva has set back
the future use of collective authority and decision making by diminishing
the amount of authority needed before an individual is considered a
managerial employee.5 7
A. The Managerial Exclusion Under Bell Aerospace
In Bell Aerospace, the Supreme Court resolved a long-standing debate
over whether the Act covered managerial employees.2" Although the
Court held that all true management employees were excluded, it never
actually defined managerial employee.2 9  The Court accepted the
• 260
Board's definition of managerial employee, but left open the possibility
254. See Lee, Collective Bargaining Part II, supra note 9, at 275 (stating "[t]he Board
has been hampered in its attempts to ascertain employees' managerial status because the
managerial exclusion is not statutory").
255. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1974) (noting that "[t]he
legislative history strongly suggests that there also were other employees, much higher in
the managerial structure, who were likewise regarded as so clearly outside the Act that no
specific exclusionary provision was thought necessary ... [w]e think the inference is plain
that 'managerial employees' were paramount among this impliedly excluded group").
256. See Sockell, supra note 13, at 995-96 (noting how, since the passage of the Act,
the composition of the current workforce has shifted towards more managerial and profes-
sional positions, making the Act's coverage of certain groups difficult to determine).
257. See Lee, Collective Bargaining Part II, supra note 9, at 282 (commenting that the
Yeshiva decision "suggest[s] that professional employees who participate in decisions that
are outside the scope of their individual work responsibilities ... are performing a man-
agement function"); cf Gergacz & Krider, supra note 253, at 913 (noting how the Yeshiva
decision misapplied the managerial exclusion doctrine to the faculty-university setting be-
cause Congress designed the doctrine for use in an industrial setting).
258. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 289. The Court held that based on Board deci-
sions, the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley amendments, and subsequent Board deci-
sions interpreting the amendments, "all [factors] point unmistakably to the conclusion that
,managerial employees' are not covered by the Act." Id.
259. See id. at 288.
260. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (stating the Court's definition of mana-
gerial employee); see also supra note 186 (discussing the Second Circuit's expanded defini-
tion of managerial employee). Following this decision, the Sixth Circuit also held the
managerial employee exclusion to "'depend[] upon the extent of [the individuals] discre-
tion, although even the authority to exercise considerable discretion does not render an
employee managerial where his decision must conform to the employer's established pol-
icy."' NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 570 F.2d. 586, 592 (6th Cir. 1978) (quoting
Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 569, 571 (1963)).
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that Congress never truly intended the exclusion. 61
1. The Ambiguous Legislative History
The Court in Bell Aerospace was quick to rely on Congress's implicit
exclusion of managerial employees from the Taft-Hartley amendments."'
As the dissent argued, this reaction may have been unwarranted.263 Con-
gress had responded to the Board's uncertain treatment of supervisory
employees with the Taft-Hartley amendments. 64 Noticeably absent from
these amendments was any mention of the term "managerial employee"
and its status under the Act."' Congress was aware of the Board's prohi-
bition against including managerial employees in the same bargaining
26
unit as rank-and-file workers. Also, though Congress carefully defined
the scope of the supervisory exclusion, it did not mention the managerial
267
exclusion. Congress's failure to create a managerial exclusion, after
amending the Wagner Act twice, did not necessarily signal its intent to
261
exclude managerial employees from the Act's coverage.
The Court based its justification for the exclusion upon a misreading of
the statute. 69 The Act guarantees its protections to those employees as
defined by the Act,270 with certain enumerated exceptions. 7 ' The Court
believed incorrectly that the absence of an express managerial exclusion
was not due to a congressional oversight, but was based on a belief that
expressly stating the exclusion was unnecessary.2n The Court, attempting
261. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 304 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that "there is
no warrant for the assumption that groups of employees, which the statute, or express leg-
islative statements, do not address, are to be excluded from the Act").
262. See id. at 275 (stating that "Congress intended to exclude from the protections of
the Act all employees properly classified as 'managerial'").
263. See id. at 297 (White, J., dissenting).
264. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text (describing the supervisory exclu-
sion as a response to Board decisions that often vacillated on the protection of supervisory
employees).
265. See Feldman, supra note 184, at 547.
266. See id.
267. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 297 (White, J., dissenting).
268. See Germana, supra note 10, at 415 (arguing that, in light of the Board's failure to
decide whether managerial employees could organize, Congress could not be said to have
deemed an explicit exclusion provision unnecessary).
269. See id. (arguing that Justice Powell misinterpreted the legislative history, as he
believed that Congress's specific exclusion of supervisory employees indicated that it saw
no need to exclude those with even more authority and more susceptibility to divided loy-
alties).
270. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).
271. See id. (excluding supervisors, but not managers, from the Act's coverage).
272. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 283-84; see also Feldman, supra note 184, at 547.
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to defend the implicit exclusion, relied on decisions that uniformly ex-
cluded individuals above the supervisory level.273 However, congres-
sional failure to expressly exclude managerial employees could also
mean that Congress did not seek to exclude them, because the drafters'
of the Act were so careful to expressly exclude supervisory employees.
2. Board Treatment of Managerial Employees Reveals No Intent to
Exclude Them
Prior to the Taft-Hartley amendments, contrary to the Court's belief in
Bell Aerospace, the Board did not expressly exclude managerial employ-
ees from the Act's coverage.275 The subtle distinction that the Bell Aero-
space Court overlooked was the determination of whether managerial
employees could be included in particular units versus whether, as mana-
gerial employees, they were excluded completely from the Act's cover-276
age. Post Taft-Hartley decisions by the Board determined only that it
would be inappropriate to include certain employees associated with
management and rank-and-file workers within the same bargaining
277
unit. As the majority correctly pointed out, Board decisions never in-
volved the certification of a separate bargaining unit consisting of mana-
gerial employees. Previous Board cases addressed only whether mana-
gerial employees had a "community of interest" with rank-and-file
employees in determining appropriate bargaining units. 79 Board deci-
sions, however, never held that managerial employees, in their own bar-
280gaining unit, were unprotected by the Act.
273. See Rabban, supra note 5, at 1814.
274. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,297 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
275. See id. at 299 (White, J., dissenting) (noting how prior to 1947, the Board never
completely excluded managerial employees from the Act's protections).
276. See Feldman, supra note 184, at 548; cf. NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec.
Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 179-80 (1981) (describing the Board's approach to exclu-
sion of confidential employees from proposed bargaining units without determining
whether the Act covered these "confidential employees").
277. See, e.g., Denton's, Inc., 83 N.L.R.B. 35, 37 (1949) (holding that buyers and assis-
tant buyers were to be excluded from proposed bargaining unit because their interests
"are more closely identified with management"); Denver Dry Goods Co., 74 N.L.R.B.
1167, 1175 (1947) (excluding assistant buyers from a unit of clerical employees because
their interests were "more closely identified with those of management"); Dravo Corp., 54
N.L.R.B. 1174, 1177 (1944) (excluding buyers from a clerical unit without determining the
bargaining rights of buyers, as managerial employees).
278. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 276.
279. See id. at 299-300 (White, J., dissenting).
280. See id. at 301-02 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that the Taft-Hartley amendments
were passed "in light of a renewed Board policy... which excluded managerial employees
from rank-and-file units but had never denied them the right to establish separate bar-
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The Court stated that it was bound to pay deference to both the legis-
lative history and administrative interpretation of the Act."' In light of
the Board's recent treatment of managerial employees, however, the
Court clearly ignored this statement. For example, in North Arkansas
Electric Cooperative, Inc.2 the Board determined that managerial em-
ployees could collectively bargain under the Act.283 The Court subse-
quently ignored the deference it previously had paid to Board deci-
sions.' '8 In Bell Aerospace, the Court determined that, regardless of the
Board's decision in North Arkansas, prior decisions had not recognized
any separate unit of managerial employees. 285 Thus, the Court's analysis
simply disregarded the Board's new interpretation and instead deter-
mined that prior Board rulings signaled the intent to exclude managerial
employees from the protections of the Act.286
3. The Divided Loyalty Argument Is No Longer Relevant to the
Managerial Exclusion
Justice Powell's opinion in Bell Aerospace reflected his desire to main-
tain a sharp dividing line between labor and management, as demon-
strated previously in the Packard Motor Car decision.2 The Bell Aero-
space Court determined that an employer is entitled to the undivided
loyalty of its managerial employees.m The decision was in part an effort
to extend this principle by sweeping all managerial employees into the
gaining units or placed them outside the Act's definition of 'employee"').
281. See id. at 274-75.
282. 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970).
283. See id. at 550-51; see also Crain, supra note 100, at 975. These managerial em-
ployees would be excluded, though, only if it could be shown that they had a part in shap-
ing or implementing labor policy for their employer, and therefore did not belong in a unit
of workers who merely carried out the employer's policy. See North Arkansas, 185
N.L.R.B. at 550-51.
284. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 287-88.
285. See id.
286. See Crain, supra note 100, at 975 (stating that the Court felt that the managerial
exclusion applied to those, in the Board's estimation, who "were involved in shaping or
implementing labor relations policies for their employers").
287. See Germana, supra note 10, at 416. Justice Powell quoted the dissenting opinion
in Packard Motor Car, in which Justice Douglas stated, "once vice-presidents, managers,
superintendents, foremen all are unionized, management and labor will become more of a
solid phalanx than separate factions in warring camps." Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 278.
In NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., Justice Powell once
again echoed his belief that the Act clearly intended to create a dividing line between em-
ployees and management, a line that was "fundamental to the industrial philosophy of the
labor laws in this country." See 454 U.S. 170, 193 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
288. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 281,284 n.13.
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exclusion. 289 The Court, however, failed to address the issue of whether
the managerial exclusion resulted from a concern about a managerial
employee's divided loyalties.29° Instead, the Court's decision implied that
divided loyalty is not even an issue in determining a worker's status.2 91
This somewhat inconsistent view of the "'fundamental . . . industrial
philosophy"' emphasized in the majority's reasoning could not have been
intended to create an across-the-board managerial exclusion.292
In Bell Aerospace, the Court ignored the divided loyalty argument,
• • 291
which had served as the foundation for the managerial exclusion. In a
similar fashion, the Court in Yeshiva ignored the need for workplace co-
operation between management and labor.9 The decision in Yeshiva
may restrain the use of collective authority through workplace coopera-
tion, which is endorsed by even the Department of Labor.95
B. The Extension of the Managerial Exclusion to Worker Participation
Schemes
The Court in Bell Aerospace and Yeshiva failed to anticipate that there
would be a growth of "collective action" in the workplace, where labor
296
and management would intentionally work together. Workers in some
289. See Barney, supra note 132, at 348 (noting how the Court's decision could result
in thousands of white collar workers loosing the Act's protections). But see Sockell, supra
note 13, at 992 (noting how "[t]he language of the NLRA, and the cases interpreting it,
would seem to imply that supervisors, professionals, managers, and nonmanagers can be
clearly distinguished from one another"). The distinctions that the courts and Congress
tried to draw were not an answer, however, because these distinctions were never easy to
apply. See id. at 994.
290. See Feldman, supra note 184, at 554 (explaining how the Court did not respond to
the Board's belief that the "divided loyalties" argument, by the employer in Bell Aero-
space, was too speculative).
291. See id.; see also Germana, supra note 10, at 418-20 (describing the analysis by the
Eighth Circuit in Noranda Aluminum, Inc. v. NLRB, 751 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1984), that dis-
counted the possible issue of divided loyalties unless the evidence showed that such a divi-
sion actually existed).
292. See Crain, supra note 100, at 976-77.
293. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 281 & n.l (noting that the House Reports of the
Taft-Hartley amendments expressed a concern "that unionization of supervisors had de-
prived employers of the loyal representations to which they were entitled").
294. See Crain, supra note 100, at 984. The Court's desire to maintain the clear divi-
sion between labor and management would preclude any form of workplace democracy
from being achieved, a central theory behind the Wagner Act's passage. See id.
295. See Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 13, at 12 (noting that "[tihe Department of
Labor has taken a strong position in support of labor-management cooperation").
296. See Beranek, supra note 32, at 189-92 (discussing the growing popularity of
worker participation programs); see also Steven M. Fetter & Joy K. Reynolds, Labor-
Management Cooperation and the Law: Perspectives From Year Two of the Laws Project,
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participatory schemes actually are taking on traditional management re-
sponsibilities and duties.2 97 With the increasing use of participatory man-
agement schemes, there is the looming issue of how much authority a
worker may acquire before he is excluded from the Act as a managerial
employee."'
The extension of this managerial exclusion is based in part on the
Court's decision in Yeshiva.'9' Employees who are authorized to act on
behalf of management while serving on the team could potentially be
stripped of the Act's protections.0 This situation may occur even though
the employees do not exercise ultimate decision-making authority.""
Thus, as the success and approval of worker participation plans grows,
more managerial type duties may be allocated to workers, thereby mak-
ing them vulnerable to exclusion from the Act's coverage.
302
C. The Saturn Experience: Illustrating the Potential to Extend the
Managerial Exclusion
One place that the extension of the managerial exclusion has arisen is
at Saturn Auto Works.3 3 The Saturn project was a result of a joint effort
23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 3, 11-12 (1988) (explaining the growth of labor-management
cooperation in the auto industry, public utility field, and steel manufacturing industry).
297. See Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 13, at 11-12 (noting how, at Pontiac Motors,
workers are beginning to share responsibility in areas that traditionally have been left to
the exclusive control of management); Woolf, supra note 251, at 578-79 (describing how
the Saturn plan has enabled workers at every level of the operation to take an active role
in organizational decision making).
298. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 611 (noting that as worker participation plans become
more successful, workers may take on more authority, thereby increasing the possibility
that they will lose the Act's protections as managerial employees). But see Kohler, supra
note 33, at 541 (stating that the proposition that rank-and-file workers could become
managerial through their inclusion in participatory schemes is "fundamentaly unsound").
Even though worker participation schemes might eliminate the need for some levels of
supervision, it is unlikely that these workers would resemble upper level management. See
id. Ultimately, the team's decisions must conform to the established policy of manage-
ment, leaving little room for the team to effectuate its own policies or beliefs. See id. at
541-42.
299. See Lipsky, supra note 39, at 685 (noting how employees who act in concert with
the employer in participatory schemes may be excluded from the Act's coverage).
300. See id. at 686.
301. See Alexander, supra note 250, at 432.
302. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 611. These added responsibilities could come in the
form of greater acceptance by management of the teams suggestions or recommendations.
See id.
303. See Jim Hilton, Participatory Management and the NLRA: Does the Act Cover
Saturn's Autoworkers?, 73 B.U. L. REV. 673, 684-87 (1993) (detailing the specific types of
authority that the workers at Saturn are granted and which could serve as a basis for their
exclusion from the protections of the Act); Maralyn Edid, How Power Will Be Balanced
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between General Motors (GM) and the United Auto Workers (UAW).3°
The parties created a full partnership between management and labor in
the planning and production stages of manufacturing. 3'5 All policy deci-
sions regarding Saturn's production are designed to be a product of joint
efforts by GM and the UAW. °6
The terms of the agreement encompass numerous areas of traditional
labor-management relations. °7 Most importantly, the agreement limits
the number of job classifications at the Saturn plant, with one category
for operating technicians and three to five other categories for skilled
technicians. 38 The driving force behind the limited number of positions
was to help integrate all employees into the production process and the
ultimate success of the organization .3° As a result, the agreement elimi-
nated many traditional barriers between management and labor, which
in the past contributed to worker dissatisfaction and reduced quality.31°
The workers are organized into work units, consisting of between six to
fifteen workers, each possessing increased authority and responsibilities
over inventory quality control and other traditional management func-
tions.31'
on Saturn's Shop Floor, Bus. WK., Aug. 5, 1985, at 65 (noting that the basic groups in the
Saturn plant will be work teams, which "will decide who does which job [and] will also
maintain equipment, order supplies, and set the relief and vacation schedules of its mem-
bers").
304. See Gregory J. Hare, Employee Participation Programs: A Great Idea, But Are
They Lawful?, 1991 DET. C.L. REV. 973, 985 (explaining the history of General Motors's
efforts which led to the development of the Saturn Project). Planning for this project in-
volved the use of new methods of both production and labor relations, where "[a]ll deci-
sions [between labor and management] must be reached by consensus." James B. Treece,
Here Comes GM's Saturn: More Than a Car, It Is GM's Hope for Reinventing Itself, Bus.
WK., Apr. 9, 1990, at 59.
305. See Edid, supra note 303, at 65; see also Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 13, at 39
(describing the origin of the joint effort between GM and the UAW).
306. See Kafker, supra note 6, at 711 (noting that "UAW presence at every level is
particularly significant because of the consensus decisionmaking philosophy at Saturn").
In these more advanced and meaningful worker participation programs, there is com-
monly a shift from a hierarchical to a shared decision-making system. See Alexander, su-
pra note 250, at 432.
307. See Kafker, supra note 6, at 705-15 (detailing the various provisions that will gov-
ern the relationship between GM and the UAW). GM and the UAW designed the
agreement to contain "'broad guiding principles for the parties to follow in fulfilling the
mission of Saturn."' Id. at 706.
308. See id. at 708.
309. See id. at 708-09 (noting how the agreement "set out Saturn's People Philosophy,
which was 'that all people want to be involved in decisions that affect them"').
310. See id. at 709.
311. See id. at 709-10. The units have responsibility for such things as quality and cost
control, machinery maintenance, job assignment and training, and communication both
within and outside the group. See id.
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Based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Taft-Hartley
amendments, however, the amount of power possessed by the workers at
112Saturn may result in their classification as managerial employees. Al-
though the work teams reside at the bottom of the managerial structure,
the teams are still empowered to share in the decisionmaking process."'
No action can be taken without joint approval by labor and manage-
ment."4 The high level of worker participation at Saturn has resulted in
more workers occupying management positions at Saturn than at other
auto manufacturers."5 The agreement between GM and the UAW re-
moved many of the symbolic distinctions between management and
workers."6 Workers and managers, for example, eat in the same dining
rooms, are both paid by salary, and do not punch time clocks.t 7
The manner in which the Saturn workers gained their increased
authority is analogous to the COMS decision, in which the Board denied
faculty members the protections of the Act."' In both situations, the
workers bargained with the employer for increased authority in the
workplace." 9 Also, in each situation management gave workers respon-
sibilities that could be construed as "managerial" in nature. As a re-
sult, the Saturn workers, like the employees in COMS, may have un-
knowingly become managerial employees, stripped of the Act's
312. See id. at 730-31 (discussing the uncertainty in the application of the managerial
exclusion to the individuals employed at the Saturn auto plant); see also Price, supra note
49, at 1395 (noting that the idea at the Saturn plant "was that if workers took on more re-
sponsibility, fewer managers would be needed").
313. See Kafker, supra note 6, at 711-12 (stating that the degree of worker participa-
tion in the decision-making process at Saturn is unprecedented).
314. See id.
315. See Woolf, supra note 251, at 579.
316. See Kafker, supra note 6, at 709. Blurring the distinction between management
and labor may be one factor that will lead to the exclusion of the Saturn workers as mana-
gerial employees. See generally Sockell, supra note 13, at 992.
317. See Kafker, supra note 6, at 709.
318. See College of Osteopathic Med.& Surgery, 265 N.L.R.B. 295,297 (1982); cf. Hil-
ton, supra note 303, at 687 (commenting that the exercise of collective bargaining rights
should not be the basis for being removed from the coverage of the Act).
319. See College of Osteopathic Med., 265 N.L.R.B. at 297; Kafker, supra note 6, at
705-10. One difference, however, was that the Saturn agreement was reached in a more
cooperative manner and the COMS agreement was reached in a more adversarial manner.
See id. at 705.
320. See College of Osteopathic Med., 265 N.L.R.B. at 296-97 (finding that the faculty,
inter alia, had the authority to formulate the College's academic policy, hiring policy, and
student academic standards); Woolf, supra note 251, at 578-79 (noting that each work unit
at Saturn "is responsible for hiring its own [team] members and making various produc-
tion-related decisions") (footnote omitted).
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protections.32'
There is some doubt, though, as to whether the UAW workers at the
Saturn plant actually could be considered managerial employees."' The
most obvious distinction between the Saturn workers and "managerial
employees" is that the workers at Saturn "are at the bottom level rather
than a high level in the firm 'managerial structure' and their interests are
aligned with labor," not with management."' As the Court found in Ye-
shiva, a prerequisite to being declared a managerial employee is that the
individual's interests are aligned with management's interests. 24 Thus,
the Saturn workers might not even fit the definition of a managerial em-
ployee, as defined currently by the Court.
Additionally, the Saturn workers only participate in the enterprise
"through the instrumentality of their union." '325 The workers do not
"formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and mak-
ing operative the decisions of their employer. 3 26 Instead, the "workers'
ideas filter up through management. 3 27 The structure at Saturn consists
of three to six work units, each of which is overseen by a company work
328unit advisor. The next level consists of business units, "which are inte-
grated groups of work units" and are staffed by "all work unit advisors, a
plant manager,. . . and a UAW advisor elected from the business unit at
large., 329 The highest management level at Saturn is the "Strategic Advi-
sory Committee, which is responsible for business planning and Saturn's
relationship with dealers, suppliers, stockholders, and the public at
large., 330 As a result of this hierarchical structure, it is arguable that the
Saturn workers are not managerial employees because they may not sat-
321. See College of Osteopathic Med., 265 N.L.R.B. at 297. The Board stated:
[T]he COMS faculty currently has almost plenary authority in academic matters
and significant input into important nonacademic matters. The faculty is instru-
mental not only in the day-to-day operation of the College but also in its long-
range policy planning. Moreover, faculty members have considerable influence
over their colleagues' job security and advancement. In sum, the COMS faculty
clearly has managerial authority as outlined in Yeshiva ....
Id.
322. See Kafker, supra note 6, at 729.
323. Id. at 731.
324. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 682-83 (1980) (holding that a manage-
rial employee "must exercise discretion within, or even independently of, established em-
ployer policy and must be aligned with management") (citation omitted).
325. See Hare, supra note 304, at 985-86.
326. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 682 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
327. Kafker, supra note 6, at 710.
328. See id. at 711.
329. Id.
330. Id. (footnote omitted).
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isfy the Yeshiva definition.
The situation at Saturn admittedly is unique,3 ' but may be a model for
other industries. Businesses may be moving away from the hierarchical
system of management and toward the increased use of participation
programs."' The newness of this program makes determining the work-
ers' status very difficult.3  This ambiguous possible result of being ex-
cluded or protected by the Act depending on the amount of authority a
worker possesses, combined with the fact that the Department of Labor
encourages the use of cooperative programs, is problematic. Ultimately,
the transformation of rank-and-file workers into managerial employees
may serve as a disincentive to future use of these programs.
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH THE MANAGERIAL EXCLUSION: THE NEED TO
ADAPT CURRENT LAW TO THE CHANGING WORKFORCE
Participatory schemes, which often are implemented through collective
bargaining, may result in workers abrogating their statutory rights.3
Therefore, as an initial step in clarifying the managerial exclusion and
encouraging the further use of participatory schemes, the Board should
utilize its authority336 to promulgate rules, pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).337
331. See generally Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 682.
332. See Woolf, supra note 251, at 581-82 (stating that the problem with determining
the effects of the Saturn program is that this program is like none ever challenged in the
past).
333. See Hilton, supra note 303, at 676 (discussing the potential for expansion of the
Saturn model).
334. See Woolf, supra note 251, at 581-82.
335. See, e.g., College of Osteopathic Medicine & Surgery, 265 N.L.R.B. 295 (1982).
The Board in COMS determined that the extent, and not the source, of the managerial
authority was the determining factor in an exclusion question. See id. at 298. The Board,
relying on Yeshiva, stated that the "decision does not expressly or impliedly distinguish
situations in which managerial authority was gained through collective bargaining from
situations in which [it] was more freely granted, and we do not believe that such a distinc-
tion is required by the Act." Id. In denying the faculty protection under the Act, the
Board, in essence, approved a situation where employees could lose their statutory protec-
tion by exercising it to gain more authority. See id.
336. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1994). Section 156 authorizes the Board "to make, amend,
and rescind ... such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of this subchapter." Id.
337. See id.; see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (stating
that "the Board is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative pro-
ceeding and that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance
within the Board's discretion"); Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB's First Rulemaking: An
Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274, 277-78 (1991).(noting that the Board's author-
ity to promulgate such rules was reaffirmed by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947).
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Rule making by the Board, as opposed to case-by-case adjudication,
would be a better method of proceeding for numerous reasons. Rule
making would provide the Board with gains in administrative efficiency,
while at the same time offering the affected parties and public more par-
ticipation in the process of drafting regulatory standards.338 Additionally,
enforcement could be advanced through the use of rule making by elimi-
nating the need for factual based adjudications.339 The Board has utilized
notice and comment rule making already in other areas of labor-
management relations.140 Furthermore, the use of rule making by the
Board has been upheld already by the Supreme Court,341 and resulted in
achieving the primary goal of rule making; namely, lots of empirical data,
broad participation by affected parties, a clear policy, and stability.342
As a result, the Board could promulgate a rule defining managerial
status based on the duties performed by the employees in question, not
on the employer's characterization of the position.14' To alleviate some
of the ambiguities in the legislative history,344 the Board needs to estab-
lish a formal definition of managerial authority.
The next step in clarifying the managerial exclusion is a clear defini-
tion, within the rule, distinguishing those individuals covered and those
excluded by the Act 45 This definition should define clearly what are
managerial duties or responsibilities. 346  This definition would notify
338. See Grunewald, supra note 337, at 278.
339. See id. at 282.
340. See, e.g., Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 29 C.F.R. §
103.30 (1998).
341. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 609-610 (1991) (finding that
section 6 of the NLRA is "unquestionably sufficient to authorize" the promulgation of a
rule by the Board); see also Grunewald, supra note 337, at 316 (noting that the decision in
American Hospital Association put to rest the question of "the power of the Board to use
rule making generally").
342. See Grunewald, supra note 337, at 320-21 (listing benefits that have resulted from
the Board's use of rule making); see also Richard K. Berg, Re-examining Policy Proce-
dures: The Choice Between Rulemaking and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 149, 163-64
(1986) (listing advantages of use of rule making instead of adjudication by an agency).
343. See Feldman, supra note 184, at 555.
344. See, e.g., Crain, supra note 100, at 976-77 (discussing the disagreement in the Bell
Aerospace decision regarding whether Congress had intended to exclude managerial em-
ployees from the Act's protections).
345. See id. at 1014 (explaining that the line must be redrawn not to separate labor and
management, but to separate labor and capital); cf. Barney, supra note 132, at 380 (sug-
gesting specific language that could be inserted into the existing definition of "employee"
under section 2(3) of the NLRA so that managerial employees might be included).
346. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 611 (stating that "[a]uthority to decide what to pro-
duce, at what price, and for what markets" could be used in defining the scope of the
managerial employee's authority); see also Barney, supra note 132, at 381 (proposing that
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workers as to the degree of authority they could attain before losing the
Act's protections as a managerial employee.3 47  This definition would
serve also to help distinguish, within an organization, managerial em-
ployees from rank-and-file employees, who currently may differ only be-
cause of the higher wages received by managerial employees.348
In the alternative, the Board could formulate a rule similar to the
"community of interest" test that is used in determining the appropriate
composition of bargaining units.349 If the Board determined that mana-
gerial and rank-and-file employees shared a "similar economic situa-
tion," the Board appropriately could include both groups within the
same bargaining unit and not have to exclude managerial employees
from the Act's protections.35°
These steps are applicable also in seeking to protect those workers in-
volved in participatory schemes, whether the "scheme is formal or in-
formal, or established by the employer or the employees." '351 A rule,
clarifying or specifically defining the managerial exclusion, should be en-
acted to specifically protect those employees involved in worker partici-
352pation schemes. This rule would cover employees regardless of the
manner in which they gained managerial authority, or the lack or pres-
ence of certain managerial-like authority or responsibilities within the
a definition of managerial employee could state that the term included "any individual
having the authority to exercise considerable discretion, independent of both a superior's
approval and the employer's established policies and regulations, in formulating, deter-
mining, or effectuating the employer's policies").
347. Cf. Hilton, supra note 303, at 692 (offering a proposed revision to the "supervi-
sor" definition in the NLRA that would prevent workers in a Saturn-type unit from losing
employee status under the Act). But see College of Osteopathic Med. & Surgery, 265
N.L.R.B. 295, 298 (1982) (demonstrating how workers can have this authority foisted upon
them and still lose their statutory protections).
348. See Crain, supra note 100, at 1012.
349. See id. at 1016-17.
350. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (discussing "community of inter-
est").
351. See Lipsky, supra note 39, at 688.
352. See id. at 687. This goal would be accomplished also with the passage of the
TEAM Act, which would legitimize the use of QCs in the workplace and avoid any unfair
labor practice charges under the Act. See Rafael Gely, Whose Team Are You On? My
Team or My TEAM?: The NLRA's Section 8(A)(2) and the TEAM Act, 49 RUTGERS L.
REV. 323, 394-95 (1997). The TEAM Act, which was vetoed, would have protected em-
ployers from unfair labor practice charges when they established workplace participatory
programs. See id. In addition to legalizing the use of employer supported cooperative
programs, the TEAM Act would have included language excluding participants from the
managerial employee exclusion. Cf Alexander, supra note 250, at 432 (noting how the
managerial exclusion could be applied to individuals involved in worker participation
schemes).
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participatory scheme.353
V. CONCLUSION
Congress intended the National Labor Relations Act to protect
American workers both in the workplace and at home by providing em-
ployees with more meaningful collective bargaining rights.3 54 The Act
imposed various affirmative duties on employers and guaranteed work-
ers the right to free association. The protected class of individuals under
the Act initially was very clear.5 As case law developed, and Congress
acted, the changing nature of the workplace increased the uncertainty
between covered and uncovered workers. Board and Supreme Court
decisions interpreting congressional intent proved to be just as ambigu-
ous.
As the U.S. workforce grows and explores new avenues of cooperation
and production, the distinctions between covered and uncovered workers
are even more important. Management and labor, working side-by-side,
may both be included or excluded from the Act's protections. An indi-
vidual's protection under the Act could depend on the exact duties and
responsibilities that each worker possesses, both individually and as a
group. The need to determine clearly who plays on management's team
and who is on labor's team cannot be understated. The collapse of the
distinctions between workers can serve only to hinder the type of labor-
management cooperation that was at the heart of the National Labor
Relations Act.
353. Cf. Lipsky, supra note 39, at 688; Hilton, supra note 303, at 689 (stating how an
amendment to the Act could focus its protections on those managerial employees who
gained their authority through collective bargaining).
354. See supra Part II.A. (describing the intent of the Act and the goals it sought to
achieve).
355. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (noting how the initial definition of
employee under the Act had only three clearly defined exclusions).
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